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ABSTRACT 
Insider threats pose a severe risk to DOD networks and the missions they support. 
With trusted access, insiders can manipulate critical and sensitive cyber systems. These 
threats can be difficult to detect, given their trusted access. There is a need for early 
indications and warnings of deceptive activity so that the damage from these malicious 
actors can be stopped or limited as quickly as possible. Current deception detection 
capabilities include behavioral and physical biometrics, but these techniques do not 
address unencountered users. This study researches the merit of using human-computer 
interaction (HCI) features for a deception detection capability. With data collected in an 
online survey, machine learning is used to classify deceptive or potentially deceptive 
online behavior using keyboard and mouse movement. This study demonstrates the 
potential for utilizing (HCI) as an indicator for deception and offers the possibility of 
detecting deception in unencountered users. It expands the effectiveness of early insider 
threat detection by demonstrating the ability to classify concealed or deceptive user 
activity without the need for a user-specific model created from per-user historical data.
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1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
Department of Defense (DOD) networksmaintain amyriad of sensitive information systems
that must be secured and protected. Insider threats, along with malicious activity aimed at
gaining entry into a sensitive network, pose a severe risk to DOD networks and their
associated missions based on the trusted access that personnel are granted for use of these
critical and sensitive systems and networks. There are few mitigation or detection measures
currently in place to monitor insider threat or deceptive activity on a network beyond
basic routine password or credential checks. Although insider threat has been active area
of research on hosts, network insider threat detection has received little attention. This
type of work primarily addresses two categories of insider threats: naive users and skilled
impersonators at the onset. A naive user is someone who believes they can simply falsify
answers to sensitive security questions without ramification. On the other hand, a skilled
impersonator may be someone who provides information at the time of account creation or
before trust is established, attempting to gain unauthorized access to one or more systems.
Other methods of detection in place are based on detecting deviations from known behavior
and therefore rely on a user’s historical data as a necessary comparison. For this reason, it
becomes even harder to detect a threat from a user who is new to a network, and therefore
does not have historical information to be compared to. Once an insider threat has gained
access to a network, it is exponentially more difficult to manage or track them. If un-
managed, these threats could permeate all levels of DOD networks, affecting everything
from administrative files to combat readiness and national security.
This research aims to better understand the connection between deceptive insider threat
activity and human-computer interaction (HCI) in order to determine if elements of a user’s
HCI can be utilized as a means of virtual threat detection. Specifically, this study aims to
eliminate the need for a user-specific model, thus attempting to prevent profile-less users
from gaining access and remaining undetected on critical networks. This research examines
how active deception manifests in HCI when users participate in an online survey. Using
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the survey, we specifically explore keyboard interaction and mouse movement, with the aim
of discovering deception through machine learning algorithms.
More specifically, this research focuses on three main HCI features to view deception
detection: velocity, angle, and the change in time (delta_time). These features are used
individually and in combination to determine more reliable and consistent indicators of
deception. The two machine learning algorithms used for modeling in this study are the
Random Forest Classifier and the Extra Trees Classifier.
1.1.1 Operational Relevance
If cyber insider threat detection can be automated to any degree, theDOD’s overall awareness
of potential threats on sensitive networks would increase. Determining what threat or
malicious behavior looks like in terms of HCI, and how it varies compared to typical
computer use, will enable a speed up of indications and warnings of network threat activity,
followed by the potential to limit threat access in order to mitigate malicious exposure.
The ability to determine deceptive behavior in first-time users not only benefits insider
threat detection within the DOD, but can be utilized in many other workplaces to protect
personnel and intellectual property. The ability to detect deception through a user’s keyboard
and mouse interactions offers the potential to limit dishonest behavior within the work force,
thereby creating additional barriers to entry for legitimate personnel who may attempt to
gain access to information outside of their realm, despite having proper access and clearance
to a network. Protecting the force against malicious threat actors and deception requires
a whole-of-force and defense-in-depth approach. The DOD must address a high level of
threat activity aimed at harming and degrading its effectiveness everyday. This threatening
behavior can originate from adversary countries, but can also originate from within the
country, or even within the force. Utilizing HCI to help narrow and defend along these
threat axes would create a more robust and secure DOD. The more secure a force is
from insider threat or malicious activity, the more it can focus on harnessing warfighting
capabilities to defend the country and her interests.
2
1.2 Contributions
The following list highlights the largest contributions of this study to the associated field of
research.
• Validate previous work discussed in Chapter 2 on how “unexpected” questions and
orienting responses change when a user is honest versus deceptive.
• Determine the effectiveness of velocity, angle, and delta_time on deception detection
and on a non-user specific model accuracy.
• Compare case studies of certain individuals in truth-telling versus deceptive scenarios
in order to view velocity, angle, and delta_time histograms and profiles.
• Gain insights into how deception may manifest through specific features such as
velocity, angle, and delta_time.
• Provide insight into the use of HCI features for deception detection in a non-user
specific model.
• Analyze per-user accuracy to determine how non-user specific models vary from user
to user
• Model and analyze classifiers that detect deception based on web-logged survey
information from research participants
1.3 Thesis Organization
Chapter 2 discusses background information related to this study, including deception
detection at large and behavioral biometrics. The chapter concludes with a summary of
related work and what this study aims to contribute beyond this previous work. Chapter
3 discusses our experiment, the creation and delivery of the survey, the format of the
questionnaire, and the population surveyed. Chapter 4 follows with a discussion regarding
the web logging code that was created in order to capture the specified HCI features. The
chapter concludes with details on how the data was cleaned and pre-processed prior to
modeling. Chapter 5 discusses model creation, including feature selection and extraction,
along with the models that were used and how the data was split into subsets. Chapter 6
3
discusses the results of various models in depth. Additionally, case studies are examined
to view the velocity, angle, and delta_time histograms and profiles of individual users. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of how certain factors may have influenced the study
and its associated outcomes. The final chapter, Chapter 7, discusses the overall contributions
of this study and the future work that our study can inform.
4
CHAPTER 2:
Background and Related Work
This chapter begins by familiarizing the reader with key concepts related to our research,
beginning with deception detection. It then explores topics such as behavioral biometrics,
and addresses some key shortcomings of using the aforementioned to support security
endeavors within and throughout systems. After a brief introduction to biometrics, human-
computer interaction (HCI) is explained and introduced as a possible means of detecting
deception. Previous and related work is detailed as the starting point for our study. The
chapter concludes with a brief discussion of what our research aims to add to previous
studies.
2.1 Deception Detection
Deception, at its root, occurs when a person uses “messages or signals knowingly and
intentionally” in order to “foster a false belief or conclusion by another” [1]. Deception can
manifest in many ways, including, but not limited to, counter-factual responses, information
concealment, or even by deceiving while still telling the truth [2]. Deception is not simply
lying or withholding information, but rather encompasses a broad spectrum of actions with
fluctuating motivations. On one side of the continuum, deception can be used in the form
of little white lies, motivated by the need for surprise, in interpersonal relationships. An
example on this end of the spectrum would be a small white lie surrounding a holiday
surprise, such as a surprise birthday party or a surprise Christmas gift. While the intent is
benign and the consequences minimal, this represents just one end of the spectrum. In other
cases, the motivation to deceive is ill-intended, as occurs when information is falsified,
intentionally misleading, or simply withheld [2]. The intent behind the deceptive actions
often determines the severity of its consequences. For example, if the intent to deceive is
motivated by evil, such as theft or fraud, the consequences of these actions, successful or not,
are generallymuchmore severe than those for a birthday surprise gonewrong.Motivation for
deception detection exists in nearly every sector of life. Unfortunately, detecting deception
can be time-consuming, can require expensive and unusual tools and equipment, can be
obtrusive, and can often result in false positives (FPs) and false negatives (FNs).
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Deception, on some scale, occurs in every facet of life, from interpersonal relationships to
business ventures, with varying degrees of consequence and risk. Exorbitant amounts of
money are lost annually by organizations that fail to appropriately monitor and respond to
information concealment, which can potentially lead to security incidents [3]. Despite the
financial burden that these deceptive acts can place on organizations, many corporations
still report insufficient control methods in place to detect and respond appropriately and
efficiently to concealed or misleading information attacks [3]. Within some organizations,
deceptive actions can pose even graver risk than monetary loss, such as in the DOD or the
Department of Homeland Security. In these instances, deception threats have the potential
to permeate networks at all classification levels. This can increase the risk that sensitive or
even highly classified information may be altered or exfiltrated to unauthorized personnel
who lack the proper clearance and need-to-know. Deceptive threats to these entities, while
simultaneously incurring financial burdens, could put the nation’s combat readiness and
security at risk [4].
2.2 Behavioral Biometrics
Abiometric, in general, refers to ameasurable characteristic that is unique for each individual
and may be used to verify or authenticate a person’s identity [5].
Detecting deceptive behavior by individuals largely starts with the ability to detect change,
either in the manner in which something is done, or their body’s natural response to an
event. These personal changes can be detected through numerous avenues, most commonly
physiologically or behaviorally, and can be utilized as biometrics. Physiological changes
can be revealed through measurements such as blood pressure, heart rate, sweat, and mus-
cle action potentials [6]. The polygraph-based Concealed Information Test (CIT) that is
used by the DOD relies on detecting physiological transformations, and more specifically,
electro-dermal activity and responses. Electro-dermal activity is the measurement of change
in a skin’s response to small electrical currents. While these involuntary changes result in
noticeable and measurable bodily fluctuations, they are not the only changes that take place
in the deceiver. In addition to changes at the physiological level, there are also noticeable
behavioral changes that take place, such as variation in the pitch of a person’s voice, cog-
nitive performance changes, as well as facial expressions and changing body language [6].
These observable changes can be called behavioral biometrics, so long as they can uniquely
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characterize an individual. Such biometrics often have advantages over physiological met-
rics. Utilizing a passive and transparent behavioral biometric does not require probing or
extra interaction from the user, thereby limiting the footprint and obstruction imposed on
them, and thus providing a significant advantage over physiological biometrics [6]. In fact,
subjects may be unaware that these biometrics are even being collected at times.
While physiological and behavioral biometrics are valid approaches to identifying changes
in a user’s state, either emotional or physical, some approaches are not passive and can
be quite cumbersome to implement [7]. In order to successfully detect biometric changes,
specialized tools, which are not commonly available, can be necessary. Based on these
key shortcomings, research in behavioral biometrics has largely shifted focus to the use
of HCI as a means of collecting personal biometrics for a multitude of purposes, such as
authentication, authorization, and deception detection.
Biometrics are often used for security purposes. For example, more recent versions of
Apple’s iPhone harnesses facial recognition technology for password authentication in lieu
of typical numerical password entry, while older versions utilize fingerprint technology
to perform similar functions. Depending on the end goal, the quality of uniqueness and
accuracy of a biometric characteristic may vary. For example, when utilizing a biometric,
such as fingerprint or facial recognition technology, for authentication to gain access to a
personal device, the biometric is used in a simple one-on-one comparison. The fingerprint
or face in question is only compared to the owner’s stored hash of the fingerprint or face
in order to authenticate the user. However, the store of biometrics used for identification
may be many orders of magnitude larger. For example, databases could house millions of
faces or fingerprints from which to compare, making the problem set more challenging.
Expanding databases inevitably increase the risk for an incorrect match, or FPs, due to
what is called the “doppelganger effect” [8]. Along with the potentially increasing FP rate
comes an increasing moral dilemma. For example, a small technology start-up, Clearwater
AI, utilizes facial recognition technology that scrapes all available social media outlets for
photos, garnering people’s personal information for exploitable purposes [8]. Depending on
who obtains this type of technology, a wide array of privacy issues are raised. As with any
form of authentication, the use of physical biometrics is not immune to adverse side effects
and improper usage.
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While both physical and behavioral biometrics can be used for similar purposes, it is
important to differentiate between the two. Both iris and fingerprint scanning are considered
physical attributes. On the other hand, behavioral biometrics are based on actions performed
by a person, and are generally considered much more difficult to impersonate [5], thereby
making them marginally less vulnerable to attack.
Behavioral biometrics refer to anything that a person does, such as the way they walk or
talk, that can uniquely identify them. The primary reason that behavioral characteristics and
responses may be difficult to mimic stems from the fact that they can be involuntary. Con-
trary to scientists’ original understanding surrounding perception and action, recent studies
deduce that decision processes are not entirely discrete, and therefore decision space can be
shared between subsystems prior to decision completion [9]. This complex and continual
relationship between the brain and the body’s movement delivers deeper understanding of
the inner workings of cognitive processes [10]. When a person attempts deceit, their cogni-
tive load, when compared to telling the truth, increases, as the brain is required to process
several sub-systems simultaneously to deal with items such as the morality of deception,
the justification for said deception, and how to avoid being exposed [11]. This increased
cognitive load is illustrated in subconscious physiological deviations, which manifest in
certain action responses [12]. Therefore, when a person is asked a question and intends
to lie, their brain concurrently processes both the lie that they desire to tell and what they
understand as the ground truth. In other words, there tends to be a “significant a priori
bias toward “truth,” and this bias must be overcome before a “false” or deceptive response
can come to fruition” [9]. The cognitive load that is placed on the intended liar alters their
performance in a way that may be noticeable to observers. These physiological deviations
can produce certain side effects, such as hesitation or reconsideration, that alter a person’s
movement away from a person’s originally intended trajectory [13]. The trajectory deviation
of a computer mouse opens up the possibility for alternative ways to detect deception.
2.2.1 Human-Computer Interaction
HCI can describe any feature that results from interaction between a user and an input
or output to a computer, most commonly the mouse, keyboard, or more recently, touch
screens. In addition to the human’s interaction with the computer, the computer’s interaction
with the human and the resulting influence on their state is also considered HCI [14].
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Interaction is much more involved than simple dialogue between a computer and a user,
and includes transmission considerations, experience, control, and others, that dictate items
such as channel performance and feedback, all of can drastically affect a user’s experience
and mood, thereby affecting the user’s reactions [15]. These manifested reactions can be
collected through certain HCI functions and analyzed in an attempt to determine something
about the user.
The way in which a human interacts with a computer can provide ample information about
a person. In many ways, how humans interact with machines mirror their interactions
with each other, and, therefore, can provide insight into interesting social questions. [6].
Because of the vast potential for data that HCI provides, many researchers have turned their
attention to analyzing aspects of HCI and how computer interactions change from user to
user depending on a person’s personality traits, moods, etc. The differences in how users
interact with computers can be used to profile and identify individuals, as well as determine
factors such as emotional state and deceptive behavior [16].
Keyboards, mice, and touch-pads are common peripheral devices that can be used for
analysis. Different measurements can be extracted from each of these devices in order to
undergo further analysis. For example,mousemovement can be segmented into features such
as velocity, acceleration, or trajectory. Likewise, inputs to the keyboard can be measured in
a number of ways. Common keyboard features include dwell time, which is the duration of
time that a key remains depressed, and key latency or flight, which is the time between one
key being released and the next being depressed [7]. Analysis of the relationships between
these HCI measurements can be used to gain information that not only helps explain who a
user is, but may also explain why a user acts in a particular way [17].
Every time a person operates a computing device such as a personal computer, tablet, or
cellular phone, HCI occurs, and chances are, users have consented to allowing researchers
to use those analytics to better understand the human mind. Motivation for studying HCI
extends well beyond computer scientists. Many sectors benefit from the information gleaned
from HCI, particularly advertisers, businesses, and security developers.
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2.2.2 User Profiling
As discussed in Section 2.2, user identification or authentication requires enrollment in a
database. A key difference in user profiling is that it can be utilized on novel individuals
based on observations from a general population, thereby making historical data on a
specific user irrelevant. Although user profiling provides this advantage, it also introduces a
variety of problems. User profiling is done in many ways and for many reasons. A common
example of profiling that has negative connotations is the notion of the Transportation
Security Administration profiling personnel going through airport security in order to
identify people that pose a threat to security, such as national and international terrorists.
This sort of user profiling can be based on body language or physical characteristics and
attire, and it is largely subjective. This type of subjective user profiling can be prone to
both false positives, which impose inconvenience and embarrassment on travelers, or, in the
case of false negatives, can put airports and people in grave danger. In this scenario, a FP
represents a mundane passenger who is flagged as a threat, despite no actual threat being
present. On the other hand, a FN in this scenario represents a legitimate threat slipping
through security without being flagged as a threat at all.
Another common type of profiling is based on personality traits. Personality assessments
that categorize people based on predispositions are common. These types of assessments
are commonly used by colleges or employers to better place students and employees in roles
that they might find a propensity for success. For example, the MBTI defines personality
traits based on four criteria that constitute opposing preferences, such as extroversion
or introversion, or analytic versus emotional intelligence [18]. At the culmination of the
personality test, a person can be described by a four-letter acronym, which is used to
explain how their temperament impacts their behavior and actions [18]. For example,
the most common MBTI personality type is the ISFJ, or the “Defender,” which accounts
for approximately 13.8% of the population and defines someone who has the following
personality traits: introverted (I), observant (O), feeling (F), and judging (J) [19] [20].
Since the examples above describe profiling that is prone to both subjectivity and the self-
fulfilling prophecy effect, researchers seek objective measures. They are eager to use HCI
features to profile users as discussed in Section 2.2.1, thus removing some human bias
by trading subjectivity for computer analysis and the application of artificial intelligence
techniques. Unfortunately, machine learning systems and algorithms can still be prone to
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bias, creating models that “unintentionally produce data that encode gender, ethnic and
cultural biases” [21]. Aspects of HCI can be used not only to identify and/or verify persons,
but can also be used to classify people based on age, emotions, gender, etc. For example, the
way inwhich a person types, to include all features that describe that person’s interactionwith
a keyboard, can be unique enough to identify not only the aforementioned characteristics,
but the users themselves [7].
2.3 Related Work
Our research draws on related works that discuss user-specific models for profiling and
change detection, specifically deception detection utilizing HCI.
Table 2.1 summarizes the most influential work related to this research, to include the title
of the work, modalities, key findings and other interesting information.
11
Table 2.1. A comprehensive list of the most related works and their contri-
butions to this field of study.
Title of Work Modality Results Other Information
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2.3.1 HCI deception detection
Many studies have looked at how a computer user’s behavior changes when acting decep-
tively. One study analyzed the ability to detect lies through keystroke dynamics utilizing
randomized fields that indicated whether a participant should lie or tell the truth [12]. This
study supported the cognitive load theory in that it showcased that people generally take
longer to respond when lying than when telling the truth and that the number of edits (i.e.
howmany backspaces a personmight use to correct incorrect typing) is positively correlated
with deception [12]. In addition to typing generally faster responses when acting truthfully,
one study also concluded that longer responses were typed when answering truthfully ap-
proximately 90% of the time [12]. On the other hand, the way that velocity measurements
change between truth-tellers and liars is shown in Figure 2.1.
When trying to induce a response that mimics lying, it is imperative that the researchers
create an environment where the given act is unsanctioned in order to ensure that the
underlying psychological and physiological responses to said act (the lies) remain intact [23].
If a participant is aware that the nature of their deceit is without actual consequence, the
underlying physiological responses will differ since there is no real risk of exposure, and
therefore their senses may be less heightened. Indeed, producing completely authentic
responses in a controlled environment can be difficult. A discussion of potential problems
within an induced environment is provided in Chapter 6. Either way, induced deception
should still deliver insights into how deception manifests in HCI.
Another study explored the phenomenon of the “orienting response” when users concealed
information. This study utilized accelerometers and gyroscopeswithin hand-held electronics
to prove that people respond to a triggering stimulus (i.e., being asked about a lie that they
committed, with an orienting response, which is triggered by the cognitive load and the extra
attention that they must give to the question) [11]. An orienting response can be a shifting of
position, fidgeting, or another movement, either involuntary or as a reaction to the stimulus,
and can be used to recognize deception in users. In these instances, the orienting responses
were specific to individual users.
In a study about the effect of insurance fraud on mouse movement, the results suggest that
lying produces an increase in the normalized distance of movement, a decrease in mouse
movement speed, and an overall increase in the response time. The increased movement can
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be attributed to cognitive competition between the truth and the lie, while the increase in
response time can be attributed to cognitive load theory, and the increased processing to the
time required to successfully commit the fraud [13]. Another notion is introduced in this
work: the response activation model, which states that the brain begins to subconsciously
program a response movement in order to fulfill the cognition’s intention [13]. The response
activationmodel indicates that if there is no conflict in a person’s cognitive state, their mouse
trajectory should follow a straight path towards the appropriate (ground truth) response.
However, movement trajectories take a less direct path when distractions or ground truths
are introduced, complicating the cognitive processes, and allowing the subconscious to
temporarily deviate from the shortest trajectory based on the response activation model
before the brain can fully commit to the lie [6].
Figure 2.1. The white line represents a question with high truth values. The
black line represents questions with the lowest truth values, and the grey
line represents a medium or fluctuating truth value. The questions with the
highest truth values witnessed the quickest mouse velocity responses, while
the lowest truth values were the slowest. Source: [9].
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While erratic or varied mouse movement had been explored in previous studies, Merylin
Monaro and her colleagues explored the effects and differences of expected versus unex-
pected questions in the outcome and development of their responses [22]. In this study,
an expected question refers to an auto-biographical question that could be found on one’s
identification card, such as a participant’s middle name or date of birth. On the other hand,
an unexpected question refers to a question that must be inferred from information on the
identification card, such as a person’s horoscope sign. Entering falsified information on an
expected question could be as simple as copying or regurgitating information, but to answer
an unexpected question, more critical thought must take place, and therefore, making it more
difficult to falsify. In this study, the use of unexpected questions increased the accuracy of
discriminating between truth-tellers and liars from 67% to 95% [22]. Monaro’s works also
looked at mouse trajectory, indicating that truthful user responses followed a more direct
trajectory, while lying users followed a more deviated trajectory, as shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2. The black line indicates an ideal trajectory from the cursor’s
starting point to the location of the final answer. The green line represents
the mouse trajectory of a truth-telling subject. The red line represents the
mouse trajectory of a participant who is being deceptive. The deviation and
upwards movement of the red line displays the subconscious competition
between the two end-points in liars before finally committing to a lie, denoted
as the “end point” in the upper right hand corner. Source: [22].
The use of HCI as a form of deception detection is already on-par with lie detection
technology in use today. While both electro-dermal and mouse movements show potential
for lie detection,mouse-cursormovements resulted in substantially fewer false positives than
electro-dermal CITs techniques [3]. The difference in accuracy between the two approaches
was about 15.6%, favoring mouse-cursor movement [3].
2.3.2 User-Specific Models
In general, online-based companies attempt to utilize technology to create a better user-
experience or to increase profit and sales of their products. Such companies often rely
on algorithms that run behind the scenes to create effective advertising schemes tailored
to the specific individual. In essence, these companies utilize a user’s online presence,
routine, and patterns for targeted advertisements and marketing. This type of model is
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one that is user-specific in nature, viz., it is tailored to each individual. These algorithms
operate on the assumption of “normal human behavior,” and can experience problems when
humans deviate from typical consumer behavior, whichwas seen throughout the coronavirus
pandemic 2019 [4]. A study by Epp et al. examined how a user’s keystroke dynamics were
altered depending on their current emotional state, which was self-reported at the time of
keystroke capture [7]. The authors utilized fixed-text models as a baseline in order to analyze
free-text models and how keyboard inputs shifted based on emotions such as confidence,
hesitance, nervousness, relaxation, sadness, and even tiredness [7]. This study did not induce
moods, but rather attempted to capture users’ interactions naturally throughout their days
as they experienced a range of moods, which resulted in a lack of modeling for certain
moods, such as anger, that are experienced less frequently. Additionally, this study relied
on self-reporting in terms of mood analysis. Self-reporting can have potential downfalls,
such as self-fulfilling prophecies and denial of certain feelings. For example, users who
constantly feel anxious or depressed may have reported their feelings as relative, rather
than absolute. Indeed, studies with self-reported emotional states have the potential for
misleading correlation.
Past research that aims to harness components of HCI for deception detection have re-
lied on similar user-specific models, which require historical analysis of individual users.
While these models have tremendous benefits to computer scientists, our research aims
to expand on these notions while eliminating the need for a user-specific model. Elimina-
tion of a user-specific model for HCI-based deception detection would expand detection
usability and decrease insider threat response time. The ability to detect deception by a
user who is unknown to a network has exponentially beneficial outcomes. The earlier an
attempted deception is detected, the earlier the nefarious activity can be halted, examined,
and corrected.
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This chapter describes the survey creation, the methodology behind the survey, and the
method of data collection from survey participants.
3.1 Experiment Overview
This work combines aspects of the studies detailed in Chapter 2 to find noticeable ways
that deception manifests in human-computer interaction (HCI). Our study uses an online
questionnaire to capture mouse movements, log keyboard interactions, as well as mouse
clicks, which refer to the depression of a key on a computer mouse in order to either select
or do something on the user’s screen. To create a wide variation of expected responses,
the survey uses a mix of expected and unexpected questions, baseline questions that are
to be answered truthfully, and questions that are intended to induce deception. The details
of the questionnaire follow. Through the use of the aforementioned question types, the
questionnaire aimed to elicit natural, potentially deceptive, and qualitatively deceptive
responses. Naturally deceptive responses, while unable to be measured or checked for
legitimacy, are responses that capture a user lying in a natural setting. These naturally
deceptive responses and potentially deceptive responses may occur when participants are
asked sensitive questions that could potentially disparage their reputation, as users may
wish to hide private or sensitive information from the researchers, such as their drug use
or alcohol consumption. On the other hand, our questionnaire also utilizes qualitatively
deceptive responses by asking users to answer a subset of questions while impersonating
another person, thereby influencing the responses with some level of induced deception.
While users are not necessarily lying in a natural state and their reactions and responses
may vary, the presence of deception to some degree can be categorized and confirmed.
While previous works utilize user-specific models or binary choices (as detailed above when
one answer appears on the left side of the screen and another on the right side), our research





The overall goal of the questionnaire was to create a variety of questions that would induce
both natural, potentially deceptive, and qualitatively deceptive (pretend) responses and
reactions from the participants. The questionnaire was split into two portions of identical
length. For the first half of the survey, the participant is asked to answer questions truthfully.
However, for the second portion of the survey, the participant is asked to impersonate a
close friend, significant other, or parent, in order to imitate an insider threat. Having a user
pose as another user about whom they have intimate knowledge provides insight into users
whose aim is to impersonate others, falsify information on online forms, or even accidentally
answer questions in a misleading manner. The questions that the participant is asked while
they are impersonating an individual are nearly identical to those they were asked in the first
portion of the survey. This provides consistency with respect to the questions being asked.
3.2.2 Question Response Types
The questionnaire employs a variety of submission formats, in order to capture various
types of HCI throughout the survey. There are three main types of response formats: radio
button response, drop-down menu selection, and text-box response. The submit button is
uniformly placed on each page of the survey, centered and at the bottom of the screen. The
placement of the button automatically adjusts to the participant’s window size at the time
of the survey. To promote consistency in collection, participants were asked to maximize
their browser screen and complete the survey on a laptop or desktop computer.
Radio button responses are listed horizontally with equal spacing between each response.
Questions with radio button responses are the primary form used to capture changes in
trajectory based on deceitful intent. The radio buttons are mutually exclusive and only one
answer may be submitted at a time. Participants are required to click the submit button to
advance to the next question. Since the submit buttons are uniformly located on every page,
each participant’s cursor will be in the same location at the start of a new page. A consistent
cursor start location is important so that the trajectory of mouse movement may be tracked
throughout the question responses and study, shown in Figure 3.1, per a case study based
on deception and mouse-cursor movements [3].
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Figure 3.1. The black line on the right represents a truthful response. The
(grey) line to the left is representative of hesitation that is attributed to
potential deceit and the activation response model. In general, related studies
have shown that mouse movement typically travels a more “direct path” when
a user is telling the truth (highlighted by the dark black line). However,
when a user is deceptive in nature, their cursor trajectory is less direct, and
shows hesitancy in response (represented by the grey line that moves directly
upward prior to moving towards the “no” on the image). Source: [3].
The next type of question submission mode is a drop-down menu selection. Drop down
menu selections are used for questions that have too many responses to utilize the radio
button submission, such as the month a participant was born.
The last type of question involved in the questionnaire is text response, which captures
string inputs as the response method. The text response is the primary method of measuring
keyboard interaction throughout the survey. Strings that are well-known to a user, such as
their own first and last name, are expected to be typed more quickly and efficiently than
information that may be more foreign to the user, such as another person’s first-owned car,
or even an unfamiliar first and last name.
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3.2.3 Categories of Questions
Our research subdivides questions into five hypothetical categories: white, green, yellow,
red, and orange. Each of these categories corresponds to a different type of question designed
to invoke a particular response from the survey participant. The motivation to include a
variety of questions was drawn from various works, most prominently Meriyln Monaro’s
use of unexpected questions in [22], which explores how responses vary when a question is
unexpected versus expected.Variation inmouse trajectorywhen introduced to an unexpected
question versus an expected question is illustrated in Figure 3.2, from Monaro et al’s
research [22].
Figure 3.2. Both lines portray the trajectory of mouse movement during
recorded responses from a controlled liar. On the left, the red lines are trajec-
tories from expected questions. On the right, the green lines are trajectories
from the same test subject when asked an unexpected question. Source: [22].
Our research expands upon this notion to create five separate categories that are expected
to elicit different response mechanisms and response orientations. A breakdown of the five
questions can be seen in Table 3.1.
22
Table 3.1. Categories of questions based on color-codes.
Question Type Example Participant Orienta-
tion
Intended Response
White “What year is it?” Truthful Truthful and Accu-
rate
Green “What elementary
school did you at-
tend?”
Truthful Truthful




Red “What is your first
name?”
Deceptive Deceptive
Orange “What is your horo-
scope sign?”
Truthful Unexpected
The white questions are intended to serve as a baseline for data collection. In this research,
a white question is objective and can and should be answered at the time of survey by any
and all participants in the same manner. Examples of white questions could be: “What year
is it?” or “Who is the President of the United States?” These questions have an objectively
correct answer, and since the survey was given throughout a consistent time window, the
answers from all participants should be the same. In addition to objectivity, answers to white
questions require only basic knowledge that every questionnaire candidate is expected to
know. Answers from the baseline questions can be utilized to determine the participant’s
commitment to the survey, as their answers can be easily compared to the known answers
for correctness.
A green question in this study is a simple and expected question where the response elicited
is intended to be truthful. While green questions are intended to elicit truthful responses,
there is no mechanism in place to verify that a participant is telling a full truth, a partial
truth, or no truth at all. Green questions were inspired and derived primarily from typical
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security form questions regarding basic auto-biographical information and are similar to
password reset questions. Green questions apply when the participant is asked to be truthful
(acting on their own behalf) and a question is also expected – such as the elementary school
they attended, or their first and last name. These questions are not intended to be difficult,
and are intended to be questions that are highly trafficked when it comes to online form
submissions.
A yellow question is a question where a participant is asked to be truthful, but where the
researchers expect some deviation from the ground truth based on the heightened risk of
the question, and the possibility of an orienting response. For example, a yellow question
might ask whether or not a participant has ever smoked marĳuana, or how many drinks a
person consumes on a weekly basis. While participants may or may not answer truthfully,
the sensitivity of such questions may heighten their level of awareness and correlate to how
they orient their responses, which may be recognizable through their interaction with the
human-computer interaction (HCI). Participants might exhibit a more noticeable orienting
response to a yellow question because of the social consequences and implications of
answering such a question truthfully. Because deception “requires heightened cognitive
resources,” people tend to “exert more cognitive effort when concealing information” on
key questions compared with answering benign baseline questions due to the sensitivity of
the question and their desire to preserve their lie [3].
Red questions are questions where the survey participants are explicitly asked to provide
deceptive information on the questionnaire. Red questions may take the same form as the
green or yellow questions discussed above, but participants are expected to answer the
question on behalf of another individual, which inherently makes the responses deceptive
in nature. For these questions, the participants were asked to assume another identity, such
as that of a significant other, close friend, or parent, and impersonate that person for the
remainder of the survey. We asked participants to choose the person for whom they have the
best chance of successful impersonation, in order to capture more legitimate insider threat
data.
Orange questions are a subset of both red and yellow questions, but specifically refer to
those questions that are both unexpected to the user and where the participant was asked
to impersonate an individual. While an insider threat may showcase intimate knowledge of
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basic biographical information, it may be more difficult to answer “unexpected” questions
with the same ease [22]. In this case, an “unexpected” question refers to something that is
tangentially related to basic biographical information that an insider threat may easily know,
but asked in a manner that may not be as intuitive. For example, a horoscope sign is directly
related to birth month and date. If someone knows a birth date, they can theoretically derive
a horoscope sign if given the appropriate information or background knowledge. However,
while it is quite natural to provide someone’s birth month as a string when given a birth date,
it is not as natural, nor a typical security form question, to know the corresponding horoscope
sign, which requires supplementary cognitive processes. In addition, many people may not
even know their own horoscope signs and may lack this information altogether. While this
“unexpected” question may provide insight for this study, it is possible that many people
aiming to tell the truth simply cannot answer this question either. Another example of an
unexpected question in relation to birth dates is knowing someone’s specific age. While
it may be quite simple to write down a full birth date, and it is possible to calculate age
from that date, it may not be as simple to quickly provide an associated age. This type of
question introduces room for error and miscalculation that may be indicative of potential
insider threats and deception that may be occurring.
This research aims to provide insight into certain insider threat activity that has not been
studied in-depth yet. Our research primarily utilizes the impersonated form to attempt
to understand certain insider threat behavior and activity. The intimate knowledge that
one possesses within the interpersonal relationships that are being impersonated can be
reflective of the extensive social engineering that takes place prior to high-profile and high-
risk insider threat attacks on networks of interest, and therefore provides useful information
when analyzing deception within HCI.
3.3 Survey Launch
3.3.1 Recruiting Survey Participants
All research participants were students or faculty at the NPS during the 2021 academic year.
This research was approved by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Institutional Review
Board to ensure ethical research and practices. Participants were recruited from various
academic programs and engaged in the experiment on a strictly voluntary basis. The first
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e-mail invitation was sent to the entire computer science department at the NPS. To increase
participation and diversity of responses, the next wave of e-mail invitations were sent out
to non-computer-based programs, in an attempt to collect more varied data. Presumably,
computer science and cyber operations students and faculty aremore familiarwith keyboards
and mice than their counterparts in certain other academic programs. Including other
programs was an attempt to include a wider range of computer competencies scattered
throughout the collected data.
The survey link was embedded in the e-mail invitation and participants had the option to
decline or participate in the survey by clicking on the secure link. When a user opted to
participate in the study, their survey information was logged and stored in an individual
comma-separated values (CSV) file, based on the web logging code discussed in Section
4.1. At any point, participants had the option to stop survey participation and exit the
browser. If a participant no longer wished to partake in the survey, their incomplete survey
was discarded and not included in data analysis. Survey participants were not rewarded in
any way for their assistance and cooperation throughout the research process.
The email invitation asking students and faculty to participate in this study is shown in
Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3. The e-mail example that was sent to potential survey participants
requesting participation in our study.
Once a participant clicked on the link provided in Figure 3.3, they were directed to the
survey’s landing page, which provided a more thorough introduction to the associated
research, survey completion instructions, as well as information regarding the storage of
their responses and contact information for the Principal Investigator. The landing page is
shown in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4. The page that a participant is directed to when clicking on the
survey link. Of note, the “Begin” button is in the same location (bottom
center of the page) as the “Submit” button that follows on subsequent pages
to ensure that each participant shares a common starting point for mouse
movement.
After consenting and continuing with the survey, each participant was asked to type a
small paragraph into a text box. The requested paragraph text is detailed in Figure 3.5.
The purpose of the paragraph text is two-fold. First, it enables the researchers to capture
a baseline assessment of a participant’s typing competency. In other words, this paragraph
essentially serves as a pre-survey measurement of the participant’s typing proficiency, use
of the backspace and delete buttons, and to gather an overall assessment of the user’s basic
keyboard interactions. Second, the text serves to present an environment where lying is
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sincerely disapproved, thereby elevating concern regarding possible punishment for being
deceptive. In a way, the text prompt serves as an ad hoc “honor code,” which has been proven
to “reduce people’s tendency to engage in fraudulent behavior,” and therefore heighten the
participants’ orientation toward providing truthful responses [23]. With the implied request
for ground truth, the response activation model may become clearer when participants
intend to lie. It would create more hesitancy in response time as well as different mouse
movements and keystroke rhythms, thus providing a more accurate depiction of how deceit
manifests in HCI.
Figure 3.5. The official start of the survey in which participants are asked to
type out an honor code.
The complete list of survey questions can be found in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3.
3.3.2 Responses to Survey
A number of students, particularly within the computer science and cyber operations cur-
ricula, expressed hesitation and concern with the administered survey. Practicing excellent
“cyber hygiene,” these participants contacted members of the research team to ensure that
the email and associated link were, in fact, legitimate and did not constitute an advanced
phishing scheme. The majority of concerns with survey participation were based on the
type of questions asked in the survey, which if handled incorrectly, could put participants’
vulnerable data at risk (i.e. answers to password reset questions). Out of the 107 participants
who started the survey, only 32 completed it in its entirety and, therefore, could be included
in the research. The relatively low completion rate of 29.9% can likely be attributed to per-
sonal concerns for privacy regarding their private information. While this response limited
data collection to a degree, it gave the researchers confidence that the questions being asked
would induce a legitimate activation response in participants.
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Following our discussion of the survey in Chapter 3, this chapter continues with an expla-
nation of how the data was collected through web-logging code. After, data pre-processing,
manipulation, feature extraction and label creation are discussed.
4.1 Web Logging
To maintain participants’ privacy, actual survey responses were not collected. Rather, the
input events of interest (e.g., those related to HCI) were collected and stored for data
manipulation.
Web logging code was created to capture the various input elements, such as mouse move-
ment and keystrokes. First, a dictionary was created to map numerical codes to all of the
different possible keyboard inputs, including the typewriter keypad, all of the function keys,
system keys, cursor control keys, and enter keys.
To capture mouse events, the web logging code captures timestamps for various events to
isolate mouse movement and mouse clicks. To gather information regarding trajectory, the
code takes information about the X and Y coordinates of the mouse and calculates offsets
using these coordinates.
Each keyboard and mouse event that took place during the online survey session is then
logged with either correlating numeric codes or time data. These logged events are then
loaded into a CSV file. Each survey response is automatically named by the time and date
that the survey was taken.
4.2 Data Pre-processing




Once the appropriate number of participant surveys was completed, the raw survey data
collected in individual CSV files was aggregated into a single Pandas dataframe using a
Python script. The raw data was then pre-processed for further exploitation and analysis.
Pre-processing began with sorting complete surveys from incomplete surveys, dropping
the incomplete surveys, and creating columns with basic calculations for movement and
velocity statistics.
4.2.2 Features and Headers
Our web-logging code, previously discussed in Section 4.1, was programmed to capture
data that, when loaded into a properly formatted dataframe, consisted of 10 columns: event,
question, date_time, x, y, z, id, and filename. An example of the dataframe head is shown
in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1. An example of the aggregated Pandas dataframe when the raw
data is imported individual CSV files. This is the product of running df.head()
on the aggregated dataframe. Data in this example was not included in the
study.
Header Descriptions
Event: A categorical header, based on the web-logging code, to describe the discretely
recorded events throughout the duration of the participant’s survey. Examples of events are:
mousemove, mousedown, mouseup, keydown, keyup, keypress, and mousewheel.
Question: The question column associates the data in the respective row with the question
ID from the survey’s JSON file. There are 33 unique question values recorded: NaN and
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the numbers 0-31. The NaN values correlate to an empty question ID on the survey landing
page. The numeric IDs correspond to the baseline paragraph response and the 31 survey
questions that follow. The question header allows the researchers to keep track of the type
of questions (see Section 3.2.3) in order to label and analyze HCI responses.
Date_time: The date_time column captures the calendar date, hour, minute, second and
millisecond time data of the particular survey event in an int64 format. This event timestamp
is obtained through the use of Date.now() in JavaScipt.
X, Y, and Z: X and Y refer to the screen’s plane and are utilized to capture mouse trajectory
and position during the survey. X and y are both measured as screen offsets, in units of
pixels. Z is a binary variable used to indicate pointer-dragging events. If a mouse button is
held down during an event, Z is set to 1. Otherwise, Z is 0.
ID: The ID column labels the HTML element ID attribute for which the event occurred. Each
radio-button and drop-down answer has an associated ID, which is logged when clicked or
selected by a participant. For example, if a participant selects the submit button to advance
to the next question, the data event would be “event: mousedown” with an associated ID of
“submit.” There are a total of 50 unique IDs. Tracking answer and submit IDs allows for
further and more detailed analysis once the data is completely pre-processed.
Filename: When each individual survey is taken, a unique filename is generated based on
the current filepath and then stored in the filename column.
Data Cleaning
As the CSV files were being read in from the shared folder into an aggregated dataframe, the
number of unique questions were counted. If the number of unique values in the question
column was less than 32, the survey file was dropped while being read-in. This action was
based on the assumption of missing data or an incomplete survey. Partial surveys were
discarded completely, and include surveys where people either skipped questions or did
not take the survey in its entirety by stopping prematurely. Surveys with incomplete data
were discarded. This ensured that only a set of consistent, complete data was analyzed. This
reflects our choice to allow participants to withdraw or opt out of the survey at any time, as
discussed in Section 3.3.1.
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Once all appropriate files were aggregated into a dataframe, the raw data was cleaned and
manipulated for analysis. First, we utilized a groupby operation to group the aggregated
data by “survey” so that each participant’s survey responses would be grouped together.
Once grouped properly, we sorted the values by date_time to ensure the proper order of
events.
Next, we created three new columns including delta_time, delta_position and veloc-
ity. delta_time is a measurement of the change of time between recorded events while
delta_position is a measurement of the change in position of the mouse movement based
on the x and y coordinates for a particular event. The base assumption when delta_time
is calculated is that t1 <= t2. The delta_position is an absolute value calculation, so a
positive or negative value does not denote a specific direction. Velocity refers to the instan-
taneous velocity of that discrete event, calculated from the delta_position and delta_time
features. Since delta_position is calculated with absolute value, the velocity calculation is
also directionless. The calculations for these new columns are as follows:
Listing 4.1: Change in position equation
d e l t a _ p o s i t i o n = np . s q r t ( d f [ ‘ x ’ ] . d i f f ( )∗∗2 + df [ ‘ y ’ ] . d i f f ( )∗ ∗ 2 )
34;C0_?>B8C8>= =
√
(G2 − G1)2 + (~2 − ~1)2
Listing 4.2: Change in time equation
d e l t a _ t im e = df . groupby ( ‘ su rvey ’ ) [ ’ d e l t a _ t im e ] . d i f f ( )
34;C0_C8<4 = C2 − C1
Listing 4.3: Velocity equation





Upon analysis of the newly calculated data, there were some velocities with a value of
infinity (“inf” values in Python), pointing to erroneous calculations. A calculated “inf”
value (representing infinity) based on the above calculation, is most likely due to a divide-
by zero operation when calculating velocity. Therefore, under certain circumstances, the
divisor in the velocity equation is zero, which refers to the change in time. For a change
in time to be zero, the time of two sequential recorded events must take place within
the same recorded time. Since the granularity of the clock is coarse throughout the web
logging, duplicated timestamps can occur for different events, which then create erroneous
velocities. Of note, the Date.now() which is utilized to capture the Date_time values has a
1ms resolution on Chrome, but a 2ms resolution on Firefox [24]. In some instances, these
resolutions may be even coarser. To resolve this problem, we utilized the header date_time
as a subset and any rows with the same exact date_time were dropped from the dataframe
utilizing the following code:
df = df.drop_duplicates(subset=[“date_time”])
4.2.3 Label Creation
Once the data was thoroughly cleaned, a final column was added to the dataframe, which
labeled the data. Each row was given a label which corresponded to the question color
categories discussed in 3.2.3. For example, if a question was a “baseline question,” it was
given a label of “white.” Code was written that associated the question ID (NaN or any of
0-31) with its associated color category, as determined by the color codes created by the
researchers in Section 3.2.3. Questions were labeled with the following unique color labels:
Green, White, Yellow, Red, and Orange. In addition, questions with a label of “0.0” were
categorized as “Baseline Text” and questions with “NaN” values were labeled as “Consent
Page.” Description of the five basic color categories can be found in Section 3.2.3.
Complete List of Survey Questions
This section includes a comprehensive list of the survey questions asked throughout the
questionnaire. The color of the text corresponds to the color-coded label for each respective
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question. White questions are on a black background and yellow questions are on a purple
background.
1. Baseline Text: "Please type the following in the text box below: I promise to
answer the questions truthfully and to the best of the ability, without help from
the internet. I understand the effects of lying on a questionnaire for research and
the negative consequences that can have undermining a study."
2. What is your first name?
3. What is your middle name?
4. What elementary school did you attend?
5. What gender do you identify with?
6. What is the current year? (Example: 1997)
7. In what city/town were you born?
8. What was the make of the first car you owned?
9. What month were you born?
10. What is your horoscope sign?
11. What is your birth date? (Mon/Day/Year, example: 11/2/1997)
12. How old are you? (Example: 21)
13. How many alcoholic drinks do you have weekly?
14. Have you ever smoked marĳuana?
15. What is the name of your first love?
16. Who do you trust more than anyone in this world?
17. "For the remaining set of questions, please pick a significant other, parent, or
close friend to impersonate. You should choose the person whom you know the
most information about and therefore are most likely to be able to answer the
questions truthfully and accurately. Please specify from which category below
your new identity belongs and answer the questions to the best of your ability.
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Good luck!"
18. What is your first name?
19. What is your middle name?
20. What elementary school did you attend?
21. What gender do you identify with?
22. What country do you live in? (No abbreviations)
23. In what city/town were you born?
24. What was the make of the first car you owned?
25. What month were you born?
26. What is your horoscope sign?
27. What is your birth date? (Mon/Day/Year, example: 11/2/1997)
28. How old are you? (Example: 21)
29. How many alcoholic drinks do you have weekly?
30. Have you ever smoked marĳuana?
31. What is the name of your first love?
32. Who do you trust more than anyone in this world?
A full description of the color categories can be found in Section 3.2.3.
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5.1 Deception Cues in HCI
Previous studies have looked at various forms of HCI, such as as mouse trajectory, velocity
of mouse movement, and even the speed at which one types, both as cues for deception
and for other motivations [3], [12], [22], [25]. In most of these studies, user-specific models
were utilized, comparing one user’s movement cue during deception against that same user’s
movement cue during a truth-telling scenario, and creating a model based on the differences
that specific user exhibited during the contrasting situations. In this study, our aim to create
a non user-specific model based on deception cues that could be applied to first-time users.
This would allow their trustworthiness to be determined without the need for historical data
and trend analysis on each user.
In this study, three main features were utilized for deception detection: velocity, angle, and
delta_time.
5.1.1 Velocity as a Feature
Velocity, which was detailed in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2, was calculated using the equation
in Listing 5.1. In order to calculate velocity, which is the change in position over the change
in time, delta_position was divided by delta_time, which were calculated previously using
the equations in Listings 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.
Listing 5.1: Velocity equation
v e l o c i t y = df [ ‘ d e l t a _ p o s i t i o n ’ ] / d f [ ‘ d e l t a _ t im e ’ ]
Dropping duplicated timestamp values and sorting by date_time as discussed in Section
4.2.2, in conjunction with using the groupby function in both the delta_position and
delta_time calculations ensured that the velocity data was ordered by survey, and therefore,
by user, and in the correct sequential order.
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Velocity Histograms
We decided to utilize histograms as our feature data since it enabled us to capture various
velocity profiles. These velocity profiles are discussed in more depth in Chapter 6 and many
examples are seen in Section 6.3, which includes case studies of these profiles. Utilizing
histogram features enabled more in-depth analysis regarding feature averages and standard
deviations that shed light on user behavior later in the study.
Once the decision was made to use histograms for features, we needed to determine the
appropriate bin edges that would be used in the Random Forests and Extra Trees Classifiers
for the velocity feature. To do so, we plotted the velocity of all mousemove events in a
histogram. The velocity histogram used to determine bin edges is shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1. A histogram of all calculated velocities using 100 bins. This
histogram represents a lower bin edge around 0 and an upper bin edge that
begins to taper off around 30 pixels/ms.
The histogram in Figure 5.1 plots velocities that hover around zero and steadily decline until
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approximately 27 pixels/ms, when the instances and density of velocities becomes increas-
ingly sparse. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the tail end of the histogram, we
ran quantile functions to determine the bottom and top 1% of velocities. When calculated,
the lowest 1% of velocities was 0.0. On the other end, the top 1% of velocities was approx-
imately 6.69 pixels/ms. The lower bin edge limit for velocity was always set throughout our
experiment at 0.0 pixels/ms, while the upper bin edge was set to either a 10 or 20 pixels/ms,
to account for some of the more rare activity seen on the tail end of the histogram in Figure
5.1.
5.1.2 Change in Time as a Feature
The next feature that we observed was delta_time, since it was previously calculated in order
to determine velocity. Delta_time simply measures the change in time by taking the time
differentials from one measured event to the next event. Our research included delta_time
as a feature since it can capture a user’s speed in performing certain actions, while avoiding
some device-specific dependencies such as screen resolution and pointer acceleration, and
can influence features like velocity.
Change in Time Histograms
In order to determine appropriate bin edges for the delta_time feature, we plotted the change
in time for all mousemove events into a logarithmic histogram with 40 bins. The resulting
histogram is shown in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2. A histogram of all calculated changes in time using 40 bins. This
histogram shows a lower bin edge of 0 and the majority of changes in time
occurring between 0 and 0.2x107<B.
Based on the histogram information, a lower bin edge of 0.0 ms was chosen, and an upper
bin edge of 40,000 ms or 25,000 ms was utilized for delta_time.
5.1.3 Angle as a Feature
Lastly, we utilized angle as a feature to determine HCI cues. Unlike velocity and delta_time,
which were previously calculated, angle needed to be calculated at this point in our analysis.
In order to calculate the angle, we used the equation in Listing 5.2. The calculation takes the
inverse tangent of the differential in x values squared and the differential in y values squared,
thus calculating the hypotenuse of a triangle where the two legs are the change in y and
the change in x. Once the hypotenuse of the triangle was calculated using the Pythagorean
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Theorem, the inverse tangent is utilized to calculate the associated angle.
\ = arctan ((~2 − ~1)/(G2 − G1))
Listing 5.2: Angle equation
ang l e = a r c t a n ( d f [ ‘ x ’ ] . d i f f ( ) . v a l ue s , d f [ ‘ y ’ ] . d i f f ( ) . v a l u e s )
Angle Histograms
In order to determine appropriate bin edges for the angle feature, we plotted the angles for
all mousemove events into a histogram utilizing 50 bins. The resulting histogram is shown
in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3. A histogram of all calculated angles using 50 bins.
Deducing information from the above figure, bin edges for angle were set to -3.0 radians
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for the lower bin and +3 radians for the upper bin edge. The time interval over which the
angle is measured corresponds to discrete mousemoves that the web logging code captures.
Of note, there are four distinct modes that are present in Figure 5.3: -1.6 radians, 0 radians,
1.6 radians, and 3 radians. These four modes correlate with 0°, 90°, 180°, and 360°. These
modes likely exist due to small mousemove captures that resulted in direction information
only, vice full angle measurements.
5.2 Feature Extraction
A function was created to extract the features discussed in Section 5.1 from the overall
dataframe. This function, called “extract_features” took in parameter x, some subset of the
dataframe, as an argument and returned a Pandas Series containing histogram informa-
tion of the associated feature values. The subset of the dataframes that was run through
“extract_features” can be found in Table 5.1. If either the entire dataframe or a portion of
it was used as a parameter in the “extract_features” function, each dataframe utilized the
groupby function to appropriately group by the survey (user), question, and the question
label (color). An example of the “extract_features” function and its application are detailed
in Figures 5.4 and 5.5.
Extract Features Function
Figure 5.4. An example of the extract_features() function that uses all three
features.
In Figure 5.4, histogram information of velocity, angle, and delta_time are all stored and
returned in the Pandas Series. Each histogram that is created sets the density parameter
to True, thus converting a normal histogram into a density plot. The density plot converts
values on the histogram into probability densities [26], rather than discrete values. The bins
parameter contains three elements of information. The first and second values of the bin
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parameter correspond to the lower and upper bin edges, as specified in Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2,
and 5.1.3 respectively. The third value of the bin parameter corresponds to onemore than the
number of bins to be used. For example, if the number of bins is set to 51, this corresponds
to 50 bins. Python’s numpy (imported in our Jupyter notebook as np) linspace method is
utilized to create the number of bins, evenly spaced by appropriate size, throughout the
histogram. The entire histogram is indexed by the first element in order to extract a series
that can be used to fit the model.
Extract Features Application
Figure 5.5. The code utilized to run the extract_features() function on the
entire dataframe.
In Figure 5.5, a groupby function is applied to the entire dataframe that sorts the data
by survey, question and question_label. Once the dataframe is grouped, it is passed to the
“extract_features” function and the resulting histogram that is returned is saved in a variable
called features. The features variable is an array of probability densities that make up the
probability density histogram calculated in the “extract_features” function. Next, a labels
vector was created to store the respective question_labels discussed in Section 3.2.3, such
as red, green, or yellow, in an array format. The labels vector was calculated by utilizing the
following line of code:
y = features.index.get_level_values(’question_label’).values
5.3 Models
In this study, both the Random Forest Classifier and the Extra Trees Classifier were used.
With 32 complete surveys, a Random Forest algorithm allowed us to utilize a “bagged
decision tree model,” allowing for minimization of variance [27]. In addition, Random
Forest and Extra Trees both have quick training times, which allowed us to train and
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run the model through many iterations without a large computational cost. To prevent, or
attempt to prevent over-fitting the model, close attention was paid to tuning the model’s
hyperparameters, such as adjusting the number of n_estimators from a default of 100 to
various sizes.
5.3.1 Model Validation
Once the appropriate features and label vectors were created, per Section 5.2, the data was
split into training and test sets through the use of the scikit-learn library train_test_split
function [28]. Train_test_split takes in parameters and splits them along a specified per-
centage into training and test sets. In our train_test_split, we passed in the feature vector
(X), the labels vector (y) and the associated survey_id (s_id). A specified test_size of 0.3
was indicated, which created a test set equal to 30% of the total data passed into the
train_test_split, leaving 70% of data in the training set. In addition, the stratify parameter
was set to y, which helps to ensure distribution of data between the train and test set to ensure
more accurate results. Utilizing stratify enables more even distribution of data between these
two sets, which allows for more representative samples throughout the train_test_split.
5.3.2 Model Fitting, Training, and Accuracy
The model, either utilizing a Random Forest Classifier or an Extra Trees Classifier, was
then fit using the imported classifier from sklearn.ensemble and passing in the associated
X_train and y_train information that was calculated using the train_test_split discussed
in Section 5.3.1. Once the model was fit, the accuracy of the model was the calculated by
comparing the X_test to the y_test, or rather, the feature prediction of the test set to the
actual labels of the test set. Lastly, the baseline accuracy was calculated, which represented
the chance accuracy for the given iteration based on the data being modeled. The equation in
Listing 5.3 was used to calculate baseline accuracy. Once baseline accuracy was calculated,
the accuracy of the model could be compared to the baseline accuracy to determine the
relative increase or decrease in accuracy that the model provided.
Listing 5.3: Baseline accuracy equation
b a s e l i n e _ a c c u r a c y = df [ ‘ q u e s t i o n _ l a b e l ’ ] . v a l u e _ c o un t s ( ) . max ( ) / l e n ( d f )
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5.4 Splitting Data into Subsets
To facilitate various iterations of modeling, subsets of the data were created to separate the
data both by question types and by question colors. The dataframe was originally segregated
based on question type, and then further separated by color pairs, in order to create a binary
classification problem, such as red versus green questions, for example. A comprehensive
list of the data subsets can be found in Table 5.1. Each of these subsets is used to fit models
used for prediction in order to determine which HCI deception cues manifest throughout
the various question types.
The results from the modeling are displayed and discussed in Chapter 6.
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Name of Subset in Code Question Types Included Binary Classification Colors
df The entire dataframe, includ-
ing text-based, radio-button,
selection, and checkbox ques-
tions
Green + Red
df The entire dataframe, includ-
ing text-based, radio-button,
selection, and checkbox ques-
tions
Green + Yellow
df The entire dataframe, includ-
ing text-based, radio-button,
selection, and checkbox ques-
tions
Green + Orange
df The entire dataframe, includ-
ing text-based, radio-button,
selection, and checkbox ques-
tions
Green + White
df The entire dataframe, includ-
ing text-based, radio-button,
selection, and checkbox ques-
tions
Red + Orange
df The entire dataframe, includ-
ing text-based, radio-button,
selection, and checkbox ques-
tions
Yellow + Red
df The entire dataframe, includ-
ing text-based, radio-button,
selection, and checkbox ques-
tions
Yellow + Orange
df_radio Only radio-button questions Green + Red
df_radio Only radio-button questions Green + Orange
df_text Only text-based questions Green + Red
df_text Only text-based questions Green + Orange





This chapter explores the results of various model iterations and discusses the further
exploration of certain results based on the associated prediction accuracy. After sharing
the results of the study, the chapter includes a discussion regarding the overall study, its
contributions, and areas of possible improvement.
6.1 Model Accuracy and Results Using a Random Forest
Classifier
Utilizing the cleaned dataset discussed in Section 4.2.2 and the model parameters chosen
in Chapter 5, the following accuracy results were obtained for the specified iterations run
using the Random Forest Classifier. Unless otherwise specified throughout the text or in the
associated tables, all modeling was based upon an ensemble containing 100 members.
The baseline accuracy calculated per the equation in Listing 5.3 was used for comparison
of accuracy results produced by each model. Baseline accuracy in this case refers to chance
accuracy of randomly choosing the correct binary classification. In order to determine
relative increases or decreases in accuracy that each model created, the baseline accuracy
for that iteration was compared to the accuracy produced by the classifier.
6.1.1 Velocity as a Feature
To determine a starting point, we ran single-feature binary classifications of all possible
combinations of question colors utilizing velocity as the sole feature. The entire table of
results can be found in Table 6.1. Overall, velocity did not show an increase in accuracywhen
classifying all green versus red questions, but did show increased accuracy potential, though
marginal, for every other combination of question colors. The largest percent increase in
accuracy was seen when classifying yellow versus red questions, which increased 12.92%
from its baseline accuracy of 64.95% to 77.87%. This classification distinguishes between
unexpected questions given to a truthful participant (yellow) and expected questions given
to an impersonator (red).
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Test Bin Edges # Bins Acc. Baseline Acc. ΔAcc.
Green vs. Red 0,10 100 58.73% 59.87% -1.14%
Green vs. Red 0,20 50 56.79% 59.87% -3.08%
Green vs. Yellow 0,10 100 80.14% 73.44% +6.7%
Green vs. Yellow 0,20 50 75.17% 73.44% +1.73%
Green vs. Orange 0,10 100 73.33% 72.20% +1.13%
Green vs. Orange 0,20 50 74.67% 72.2% +2.47%
Green vs. White 0,10 100 85.61% 85.26% +0.35%
Green vs. White 0,20 50 85.61% 85.26% +0.35%
Red vs. Orange 0,10 100 73.08% 63.51% +9.57%
Red vs. Orange 0,20 50 72.30% 63.51% +8.79%
Yellow vs. Red 0,10 100 77.87% 64.95% +12.92%
Yellow vs. Red 0,20 50 75.41% 64.95% +10.46%
Yellow vs. Orange 0,10 100 46.96% 51.56% -4.6%
Yellow vs. Orange 0,20 50 53.03% 51.56% +1.47%
Table 6.1. Breakdown of accuracy results using Random Forest machine
learning on binary classifications using velocity as the feature.
Rather than utilizing the entire dataframe, and therefore every question type included in the
survey, the next set of simulations isolated just radio button questions and re-ran the binary
classifications on red versus green questions and green versus orange questions only. When
isolated, radio button questions showed a 16.36% increase in accuracy when classifying red
versus green questions using only velocity as a feature, compared to a decrease in change
in accuracy when all question types were included, as seen in Table 6.1. This indicates a
16.36% increase in accuracywhen distinguishing participants that are telling the truth versus
participants who are deceiving in some manner on expected, auto-biographical questions.
Additionally, the largest increase experienced when classifying green versus orange radio
button questions was 8.0%, a 5.53% increase in accuracy of the same classification when
question type was not isolated. Full results of using velocity as the sole feature on radio
button questions can be found in Table 6.2.
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Test Bin Edges # Bins Acc. Baseline Acc. ΔAcc.
Green vs. Red 0,10 100 47.37% 52.06% -4.69%
Green vs. Red 0,20 50 63.16% 52.06% +11.1%
Green vs. Red 0,10 50 68.42% 52.06% +16.36%
Green vs. Orange 0,10 100 63.16% 55.13% +8.0%
Green vs. Orange 0,20 50 36.84% 55.13% -18.29%
Green vs. Orange 0,10 50 57.89% 55.13% +2.76%
Table 6.2. Breakdown of accuracy results using Random Forest machine
learning on binary classifications of radio button questions only using velocity
as the feature.
Not surprisingly, the accuracy results when the text-based questions were separated and run
with velocity as the sole feature were sub-par. Because velocity as a feature focuses on the
rate of change in position as a function of time, it is less prone to capturing elements of
typing, which are used for text-based responses, than mouse movements, which are used
for other types of multiple choice responses. The change in accuracy of these iterations
remained within 4.22% of baseline accuracy. This limited change in accuracy in either
direction denotes unimproved modeling for this type of question, as the accuracy remains
within a margin of error representative of guessing. Full results of using velocity only on
text-based questions are detailed in Table 6.3.
51
Test Bin Edges # Bins Acc. Baseline Acc. ΔAcc.
Green vs. Red 0,10 100 51.57% 55.79% -4.22%
Green vs. Red 0,10 200 52.20% 55.79% -3.59%
Green vs. Red 0,10 50 56.60% 55.79% +0.81%
Green vs. Orange 0,10 100 90.42% 90.85% -0.43%
Green vs. Orange 0,20 50 90.42% 90.85% -0.43%
Green vs. Orange 0,10 50 91.49% 90.85% +0.64%
Table 6.3. Breakdown of accuracy results using Random Forest machine
learning on binary classifications of text-based questions only using velocity
as the feature.
6.1.2 Angle as a Feature
The next individual feature that was explored was angle. When applied to the entire
dataframe of all question types, angle indicated more potential when distinguishing red
versus green questions compared to velocity, which showed no positive increase from base-
line accuracy. Angle was able to increase baseline accuracy by approximately 16.36%.
Additionally, angle produced a much greater increase in accuracy for the yellow versus or-
ange classification compared to velocity. Although angle improved the green versus red and
yellow versus orange classifications, it performed worse when classifying all other binary
classifications. The full results of utilizing angle as the sole feature on the entire dataset are
detailed in Table 6.4.
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Test Bin Edges # Bins Acc. Baseline Acc. ΔAcc.
Green vs. Red -3,3 50 57.89% 59.87% -1.98%
Green vs. Yellow 0,1.6 50 73.68% 73.44% +0.24%
Green vs. Orange 0,1.6 50 73.68% 72.20% +1.38%
Green vs. White 0,1.6 50 73.68% 85.26% -11.58%
Red vs. Orange 0,1.6 50 63.16% 63.51% -0.35%
Yellow vs. Red 0,1.6 50 63.16% 64.95% -1.79%
Yellow vs. Orange 0,1.6 50 68.42% 51.56% +16.86%
Table 6.4. Breakdown of accuracy results using Random Forest machine
learning on binary classifications using angle as feature on entire dataframe.
When running the Random Forest Classifier with radio button questions only using angle as
the primary feature, both green versus red and green versus orange classifications increased
in accuracy. Green versus orange classification accuracy only increased by 2.76%, producing
less favorable results when compared to velocity as the sole feature. However, the green
versus red classification increased in accuracy by 21.62%. This result was 5.26% higher in
accuracy than that achieved by velocity alone. The full data table displaying results of angle
on radio button questions is detailed in Table 6.5.
No modeling was performed on text-based questions only using angle, since angle is
not a relevant feature for keyboard input. Additionally, selection and checkbox questions
performed poorly when in isolation, and thus, we focused primarily on distinguishing green
versus red questions within the entire dataset and then distinguishing green versus red
questions that utilized radio buttons in isolation for the remainder of the study.
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Test Bin Edges # Bins Acc. Baseline Acc. ΔAcc.
Green vs. Red -3,3 50 73.68% 52.06% +21.62%
Green vs. Red -3,3 50 63.16% 52.06% +11.10%
Green vs. Orange -3,3 50 57.89% 55.13% +2.76%
Table 6.5. Breakdown of accuracy results using Random Forest machine
learning on binary classifications of radio button questions only using angle
as feature.
6.1.3 Delta Time as a Feature
The last feature to be examined individually was delta_time. Though both velocity and
angle, when utilized as individual features, had exhibited an increase in accuracy for every
classification besides green versus red, delta_time actually illustrated a decrease in accuracy
for both green versus red and green versus white. All other changes in accuracy were similar
to those indicated in Table 6.1 and Table 6.4. All results based on the effect of delta_time
on the entire dataframe are presented in Table 6.6.
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Test Bin Edges # Bins Acc. Baseline Acc. ΔAcc.
Green vs. Red 0,40000 50 58.25% 59.87% -1.62%
Green vs. Yellow 0,40000 50 80.85% 73.44% +7.41%
Green vs. Yellow 0,40000 100 82.27% 73.44% +8.83%
Green vs. Orange 0,40000 50 78.00% 72.20% +6.80%
Green vs. Orange 0,40000 100 73.33% 72.20% +1.13%
Green vs. White 0,40000 50 79.55% 85.26% -5.71%
Green vs. White 0,40000 100 83.33% 85.26% -1.93%
Red vs. Orange 0,40000 50 70.00% 63.51% +6.49%
Red vs. Orange 0,40000 100 65.38% 63.51% +1.87%
Yellow vs. Red 0,40000 50 77.87% 64.95% +12.92%
Yellow vs. Red 0,40000 100 76.23% 64.95% +11.28%
Yellow vs. Orange 0,40000 50 45.45% 51.56% -6.11%
Yellow vs. Orange 0,40000 100 57.57% 51.56% +6.01%
Table 6.6. Breakdown of accuracy results using Random Forest machine
learning on binary classifications using change in time on entire dataframe.
Once again, when analyzing radio buttons in isolation with delta_time as the sole feature,
green versus red classification exhibited an increase in accuracy, rather than a decrease in
accuracy as was the case when the entire dataframe of questions was included. Green versus
red classification displayed a 21.62% increase in accuracy when using delta_time as the
only feature, increasing the baseline accuracy of 52.06% to a model accuracy of 73.68%.
Delta_time created the highest increase in accuracy for any single feature used throughout
modeling of green versus red classification. The next highest-achieving feature was velocity,
which accrued only 5.26% less accuracy during modeling than delta_time. On the other
hand, this was the only single feature that actually decreased the prediction accuracy of the
green versus orange classification on radio button questions in isolation. Table 6.7 depicts
the results of modeling with delta_time as the sole feature on radio button questions.
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Test Bin Edges # Bins Acc. Baseline Acc. ΔAcc.
Green vs. Red 0,40000 40 73.68% 52.06% +21.62%
Green vs. Red 0,40000 100 73.68% 52.06% +21.62%
Green vs. Orange 0,40000 50 42.11% 55.13% -13.02%
Table 6.7. Breakdown of accuracy results using Random Forest machine
learning on binary classifications of radio button questions only using delta
time as feature.
6.1.4 Velocity and Angle as Combined Features
After each feature was modeled individually, combinations of the features were explored.
First, velocity and angle were combined for deeper model exploration. Accuracy increase
of both binary classifications was higher when utilizing angle and velocity in combination,
compared to using each feature individually. Using this combination for modeling, the
baseline accuracy was increased from 52.06% for green versus red classification to 78.95%
accuracy, a total increase of 26.89%. The change in accuracy for green versus orange classi-
fication mirrored the results produced by velocity alone in Table 6.2, increasing accuracy by
about 8.00%. Results of using velocity and angle on radio button questions only are detailed
in Table 6.8.
Test Vel. Edges/Bins Angle Edges/Bins Acc. Baseline ΔAcc.
Green vs. Red 0,10,100 -3,3,50 57.89% 52.06% +5.29%
Green vs. Red 0,10,100 0,10,100 78.95% 52.06% +26.89%
Green vs. Orange 0,10,50 -3,3,50 63.16% 55.13% +8.03
Table 6.8. Breakdown of accuracy results using Random Forest machine
learning on binary classifications of radio button questions using angle and
velocity in combination as feature.
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6.1.5 Velocity and Delta Time as Combined Features
The last pair of features used together in the model were velocity and delta_time. The
increase in accuracy from baseline during green versus red classification was 21.62%, the
same increase that was caused by using delta_time alone. All results, including bin edges,
bins, and n-estimators, are detailed in Table 6.9.
Test Velocity Time N-Estimators Acc. Baseline ΔAcc.
Green vs. Red 0,10,50 0,40000,40 220 68.42% 52.06% +16.36%
Green vs. Red 0,10,50 0,40000,40 100 63.15% 52.06% +11.09%
Green vs. Red 0,10,50 0,40000,40 200 68.42% 52.06% +16.36%
Green vs. Red 0,10,50 0,40000,40 300 73.68% 52.06% +21.62%
Green vs. Red 0,10,50 0,25000,50 100 73.68% 52.06% +21.62%
Table 6.9. Breakdown of accuracy results using Random Forest machine
learning on binary classifications of radio button questions only using velocity
and delta time as combined features.
6.1.6 Combining Velocity, Angle, and Delta Time as Features
When utilizing all three features on just radio button questions, accuracy increased by
16.36% for green versus red questions and by 13.29% for green versus orange questions.
The accuracy increase for green versus red was similar to that produced by using velocity
alone. However, the increase in accuracy using all three features was less than that produced
by angle, delta_time, and the combination of angle and velocity. While green versus red
did not display improved results, the classification of green versus orange was improved,
scoring approximately 5.29% higher accuracy than any other combination produced. The
breakdown of bin edges, bins and accuracy scored can be found in Table 6.10.
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Test Velocity Angle ΔTime Acc. Baseline ΔAcc.
Green vs. Red 0,10,50 -3,3,50 0,40000,40 68.42% 52.06% +16.36%
Green vs. Orange 0,10,100 0,2,100 0,40000,100 68.42% 55.13% +13.29%
Table 6.10. Breakdown of accuracy results using Random Forest machine
learning on binary classifications of radio button questions only using delta
time, velocity and angle as features in combination.
6.2 Model Accuracy and Results Using the Extra Trees
Classifier
Next, we utilized the Extra Trees Classifier, rather than the Random Forest Classifier. We
first ran the model with all red and green questions in the entire dataset. The results are
shown in Table 6.11. The modeling done in Figure 6.11 is used to develop the per-user
accuracy results depicted in Figure 6.2 and graphically in Figure 6.2.
Test Velocity Angle ΔTime Acc. Baseline ΔAcc.
Green vs. Red 0,10,50 -3,3,50 0,40000,40 59.22% 59.87% -0.65%
Table 6.11. Breakdown of accuracy results using Extra Trees Classifier on
binary classification of all red versus green questions using velocity, delta
time and angle as features in combination.
Next, we utilized the Extra Trees Classifier on radio button questions only using all three
features in conjunction. The results of this model are in Table 6.12. Overall, accuracy
increased by approximately 13.81%, a considerable increase, but still less than the model
trained by the Random Forest Classifier produced.
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Test Velocity Angle ΔTime Acc. Baseline ΔAcc.
Green vs. Red 0,10,50 -3,3,50 0,40000,40 78.94% 59.87% +13.81%
Table 6.12. Breakdown of accuracy results using Extra Trees Classifier on
binary classification of all red versus green questions using velocity, delta
time and angle as features in combination.
Next,we trained anExtra Trees classifierwith select features, velocity and delta_time, hoping
to improve upon the accuracy results demonstrated with the Random Forest Classifier in
Section 6.1. A model that was trained with the Extra Trees Classifier using velocity and
delta_time as the features performed the best when classifying green versus red questions,
increasing baseline accuracy of 52.06%by a total of 37.41%, bringing themodel’s prediction
accuracy to the highest seen in the study, 89.47%. The results of using Extra Tress on a
variety of bin edges is detailed in Table 6.13. This combination of features, utilizing the
Extra Trees Classifier, significantly outperformed any other combination of features and the
Random Forest Classifier altogether.
Test Velocity Time Acc. Baseline ΔAcc.
Green vs. Red 0,10,50 0,40000,40 89.47% 52.06% +37.41%
Green vs. Red 0,10,100 0,40000,40 78.95% 52.06% +26.89%
Green vs. Red 0,10,50 0,40000,50 84.21% 52.06% +32.15%
Table 6.13. Breakdown of accuracy results using Extra Trees machine learn-
ing on binary classifications of radio button questions only using velocity and
time as features.
6.3 Prediction Examples
Breaking the model’s predictions down by survey, and therefore isolating individual users,
allowed us to analyze per-user accuracy to determine how the model affected individual
users. We first looked at per-user accuracy when using the entire dataframe to classify red
versus green questions. This classification included all question types, such as radio button,
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selection, checkbox and text questions. While the overall model accuracy actually decreased
from the baseline accuracy of 59.87% to a model accuracy of 59.22%, looking at per-user
accuracy provides insights on how non user-specific modeling can vary from sample to
sample.
Figure 6.1 provides the per-user accuracy results of each survey. Since the entire dataframe
of red and green questions was included in the modeling, every single survey was included
in the test set, and therefore, a per-user accuracy of each survey could be calculated. The
entire survey consisted of 12 green and 10 red questions, creating a total of 22 questions to
be considered for this prediction. Out of the 32 surveys, 19 surveys scored a higher accuracy
than the model prediction (indicated by the green bars in Figure 6.2, while the remaining
13 surveys scored lower than the model accuracy (indicated by the red bars in Figure 6.2.
Of note, out of the 13 users whose accuracy was lower than model accuracy, four users
had an accuracy within 5% of model accuracy. The overall standard deviation for per-user
accuracy was 21.65%. The highest user accuracy was 100%, occurring once for survey 1.
This perfect accuracy score is 40.78% higher than model accuracy. The lowest recorded
accuracy was 0% by survey 29, accounting for a 59.22% decrease in accuracy from model
accuracy. Overall, 25% of participants were classified at least 16% more accurately using
the Extra Trees Classifier than using baseline accuracy. Out of the 32 surveys, 7 were within
5% of 59.22% accuracy, representing a 21.88% cluster around model accuracy.
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Figure 6.1. Accuracy results by user on the entire dataframe of red versus
green questions using the Extra Trees Classifier.
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Figure 6.2. Accuracy results by user on the entire dataframe of red versus
green questions using the Extra Trees Classifier.
Once we analyzed per-user accuracy of all question types, we further broke down the subset
of questions into radio button questions only. Because the survey varied in question type,
this prediction only left one green and one red question, thereby limiting the samples and
the number of surveys in the test set. Out of the 15 predictions in the test set, the model
correctly classified 13 surveys with 100.0% accuracy, one survey with 50.0% accuracy, and
one survey incorrectly. This prediction was a binary classification of red versus green radio
button questions and represents a scenario where a computer user answers the same type
of expected question truthfully and deceptively, showing the potential to flag approximately
90% of deceptive users based on velocity and angle HCI inputs, specifically when filling
out radio button submission questions on an online form. The per-user accuracy results on
radio button questions only are depicted in Figure 6.3.
Based on Figure 6.3, survey 3 had a user accuracy of 0. When investigating the test
predictions for survey 3, the question was labeled as “Red,” but predicted as “Green,”
creating a FN predicament where the user should have been flagged for being deceptive,
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but was rather classified as an honest user. This FN presents perhaps the most dangerous
situation when relying on automated technology to determine threats on a network. A more
detailed discussion of this topic can be found later in this chapter in Section 6.4.
Figure 6.3. Accuracy results by user on the test set using Extra Trees Clas-
sifier and model set up discussed in Section 6.2.
Table 6.14 provides a comprehensive comparison of question 5 to question 21 for the subset
of the test set based on Table 6.13 that was classified correctly. Questions 5 and 21 both
ask the question, “What gender do you identify with?” However, question 5 is labeled as a
green question, where the participant is asked to answer truthfully as themselves. In question
21, the participant is asked the exact same question, but asked to provide an answer while
impersonating another person, thereby inducing some level of deception into their response.
The average delta_time, velocity, and angle are listed and, when comparing question 5 to
question 21 per survey, the higher average (absolute value) of each feature per survey is
highlighted in yellow. Out of the 13 surveys that were positively classified, 10 (76.92%)
had a higher average delta_time value when answering truthfully (question 5), compared to
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when acting in a deceptivemanner (question 21). Average velocitywas fairly even, as 6 out of
13 (46.15%) participants answered faster when telling the truth, and the remaining 53.85%
of participants had higher average velocities when responding deceptively. However, when
participants demonstrated greater velocities when telling the truth vice being deceptive,
their responses were between 0.04 pixels/ms and 0.44 pixels/ms faster. On the other hand,
when participants demonstrated quicker responses while being deceptive, their increase
in average velocity covered a greater range, spanning between 0.01 pixels/ms and 0.62
pixels/ms. Survey 10 is an example of a participant who had a higher average velocity when
deceiving than when telling the truth. Details of survey 10’s velocity histograms, velocity
profiles and standard deviations can be found in Section 6.3.1. On the other hand, 62% (8
out of 13) of participants had greater average angles when acting deceptively versus acting
truthfully. Once again, survey 10 is an example case in which the participant recorded a
higher average angle for question 21 than question 5.
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Survey Question Avg. ΔTime Avg. Velocity Avg. Angle
Survey_1 5 46.33 1.45 -0.61
Survey_1 21 40.63 1.25 -0.67
Survey_4 5 50.74 0.87 -0.01
Survey_4 21 62.91 1.12 0.26
Survey_6 5 36.41 0.65 0.59
Survey_6 21 51.73 0.98 -0.28
Survey_11 5 44.70 1.04 -0.22
Survey_11 21 39.69 0.60 -0.36
Survey_13 5 30.98 0.67 -0.05
Survey_13 21 25.11 0.56 -0.57
Survey_19 5 11.64 0.98 -0.38
Survey_19 21 10.95 0.94 0.11
Survey_22 5 29.58 0.49 -0.50
Survey_22 21 18.00 0.37 0.00
Survey_23 5 23.96 1.33 0.11
Survey_23 21 21.19 1.54 -0.48
Survey_27 5 39.34 0.46 0.11
Survey_27 21 24.88 0.47 -0.35
Survey_28 5 34.46 0.64 -0.39
Survey_28 21 38.77 0.77 -0.42
Survey_29 5 23.10 0.51 -0.77
Survey_29 21 22.85 0.69 -0.89
Survey_30 5 30.65 0.95 -0.39
Survey_30 21 24.76 0.87 0.25
Survey_31 5 45.44 0.54 -0.69
Survey_31 21 31.09 1.16 -0.46
Table 6.14. Comprehensive average summary statistics for comparing green
and red responses to radio button questions. The surveys included are ones
that were correctly classified using the Extra Trees Classifier. Question 5
represents a green radio button question and question 21 is a red radio
button question. The highest feature value for each survey is highlighted in
yellow.
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The standard deviations for each feature of the subset of surveys that were correctly classified
can be found in Table 6.15. These standard deviations correspond to the average summary
statistics found in Table 6.14. On average, both delta_time and angle produced greater stan-
dard deviations when responses were truthful than deceptive. From this subset, 76.92% of
participants exhibited a higher standard deviation for delta_timewhen answering truthfully,
compared to when acting deceptively. In contrast, velocity produced a greater standard de-
viation when participants were acting deceptively rather than truthful. Specifically, 7 out of
12 (58.33%) surveys yielded a higher standard deviation for velocity when being deceptive.
Of note, survey 27 had the exact same standard deviation for both questions. An example
of a survey that follows this pattern can be seen in survey 28’s velocity histograms shown
in Figure 6.15 in Section 6.3.1.
Out of the 13 surveys analyzed, 5 out of 13 (38.46%) participants had higher standard devia-
tions of anglewhen answering deceptively. If the trajectory of mouse movement is a straight
line, the angle measurement will remain consistent. However, if a user’s mouse movement
trajectory does not occur in a straight line, the measured angle will change. An example
of how the changing mouse trajectory affects the angle measurement is demonstrated in
Figure 6.4. Correlating with previous work done regarding mouse trajectory on insurance
fraud, the greater standard deviation in angle may likely be attributed to the user’s mouse
paths following less direct routes to target destinations when deceiving than when being
honest [3]. An example of of how mouse trajectory affected angle specifically in our survey
can be seen in survey 30’s case study in Section 6.3.1, which details survey 30’s angle
histograms and angle profiles over time. The varied angle sizes and greater dispersion can
be seen in the histograms in Figure 6.23, while the higher number of distinct peaks in part
(b) of Figure 6.24 indicates more varied angles throughout mouse movement when being
deceptive.
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Figure 6.4. The left-hand graphic depicts a consistent mouse trajectory in
which the cursor follows a straight line. In this case, the angle measurement
does not change, as indicated by the blue and orange theta measurements.
On the right-hand graphic, the mouse trajectory does not follow a straight
line, thus creating a smaller angle measurement for the orange theta than
the blue theta.
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Survey Question S.D. ΔTime S.D. Velocity S. D. Angle
Survey_1 5 188.33 1.99 1.70
Survey_1 21 56.23 1.81 1.82
Survey_4 5 177.66 1.09 2.08
Survey_4 21 209.05 2.01 2.01
Survey_6 5 128.89 1.17 1.59
Survey_6 21 168.75 1.62 1.71
Survey_11 5 153.97 1.94 2.01
Survey_11 21 125.35 1.19 2.07
Survey_13 5 81.58 1.03 1.52
Survey_13 21 56.43 1.07 1.70
Survey_19 5 23.15 0.93 2.19
Survey_19 21 27.01 1.24 1.99
Survey_22 5 274.68 0.85 1.57
Survey_22 21 127.36 0.64 2.12
Survey_23 5 139.12 2.39 1.64
Survey_23 21 83.37 2.34 1.58
Survey_27 5 128.80 0.79 1.89
Survey_27 21 73.48 0.79 1.48
Survey_28 5 112.17 0.62 1.95
Survey_28 21 38.77 1.15 1.83
Survey_29 5 44.38 0.60 1.84
Survey_29 21 31.42 0.77 1.83
Survey_30 5 58.59 1.23 2.18
Survey_30 21 51.22 1.19 1.91
Survey_31 5 201.85 0.83 2.08
Survey_31 21 73.32 1.79 2.01
Table 6.15. Comprehensive standard deviation summary statistics for com-
paring green and red responses to radio button questions. The surveys in-
cluded are ones that were correctly classified using the Extra Trees Classifier.
Question 5 represents a green radio button question and question 21 is a red
radio button question.
68
6.3.1 Individual Case Studies
Survey 10 Results
In order to view examples in which the classification was successful, the velocity and angle
profiles were extracted from random surveys that were predicted accurately per Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.5 reveals the velocity histograms for questions 5 and 21 (a green radio button
question and red radio button question, respectively) from survey 10, while Figure 6.6
represents the velocity profiles for the same questions. For question 5, survey 10 had an
average velocity of 0.461 pixels/ms. On the other hand, the average velocity for question
21 was 0.629 pixels/ms, 0.168 pixels/ms higher than the truth-telling response. While the
average velocity for the impersonated answer was higher, the standard deviation was also
greater. The standard deviation for velocity for question 5 was 0.593 pixels/ms and for
question 21 it was 0.951 pixels/ms, accounting for a 35.8% increase in standard deviation.
Survey 10’s Velocity Histograms
(b)(a)
Figure 6.5. (a) Survey 10’s velocity histogram for question 5, a green radio
button question. (b) Survey 10’s velocity histogram for question 21, a red
radio button question.
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Survey 10’s Velocity Profiles
(b)(a)
Figure 6.6. (a) Survey 10’s velocity profile for question 5, a green radio
button question. (b) Survey 10’s velocity profile for question 21, a red radio
button question.
Survey 10’s angle histograms and profiles, seen in Figures 6.7 and 6.8, detail the change in
the size of the angle produced by mouse movements when answering a single radio button
style question, in both a truth-telling scenario and a deceptive scenario. The average angle
for survey 10’s question 5 was -0.42 radians and the average angle for question 21 was -0.60
radians, denoting more change in trajectory on average. However, the standard deviation for
angle was 1.95 when answering truthfully, compared to a standard deviation of 1.51 when
acting deceptively.
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Survey 10’s Angle Histograms
(b)(a)
Figure 6.7. (a) Survey 10’s angle histogram for question 5, a green radio
button question. (b) Survey 10’s angle histogram for question 21, a red
radio button question.
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Survey 10’s Angle Profiles
(b)(a)
Figure 6.8. (a) Survey 10’s angle profile for question 5, a green radio button
question. (b) Survey 10’s angle profile for question 21, a red radio button
question.
Survey 13 Results
Survey 13’s velocity histograms and velocity profiles are detailed in Figures 6.9 and 6.10.
Survey 13 recorded an average velocity of 0.67 pixels/ms for question 5, compared to
an average velocity of 0.56 pixels/ms for question 21. Standard deviation was greater for
question 5 by approximately 4.6%. Looking at part (a) of Figure 6.10, the participant reached
a much higher initial velocity at the start of the question as compared to part (b), where the
participant reached about half the speed at the start of question 21. Since the user reached
a higher initial velocity while telling the truth, this could potentially indicate a quicker
response-activation model as detailed in Chapter 2. Additionally, the participant reached a
much higher velocity at the tail-end of question 21 when compared to question 5, potentially
indicating a desire to move on quickly from said deception.
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Survey 13’s Velocity Histograms
(b)(a)
Figure 6.9. (a) Survey 13’s velocity histogram for question 5, a green radio
button question. (b) Survey 13’s velocity histogram for question 21, a red
radio button question.
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Survey 13’s Velocity Profiles
(b)(a)
Figure 6.10. (a) Survey 13’s velocity profile for question 5, a green radio
button question. (b) Survey 13’s velocity profile for question 21, a red radio
button question.
The angle histograms and profiles for survey 13 are depicted in Figures 6.11 and 6.12.
Similar to survey 10, survey 13 also recorded a higher (absolute value) average for question
21, compared to question 5. The average angle for question 5 was -0.06 radians, compared
to question 21’s average of -0.57 radians. Similarly, the standard deviation for angle was
also approximately 20% greater during deception (question 21). Angle variation can be
seen when comparing parts (a) and (b) of Figure 6.11, which shows more variation and
dispersion of angle size in part (b).
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Survey 13’s Angle Histograms
(b)(a)
Figure 6.11. (a) Survey 13’s angle histogram for question 5, a green radio
button question. (b) Survey 13’s angle histogram for question 21, a red radio
button question.
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Survey 13’s Angle Profiles
(b)(a)
Figure 6.12. (a) Survey 13’s angle profile for question 5, a green radio button
question. (b) Survey 13’s angle profile for question 21, a red radio button
question.
The delta_time histograms for survey 13’s question 5 and question 21 are depicted in Figure
6.13, while the delta_time profiles are depicted in Figure 6.14. The average change in time
for question 5 was 30.98 ms, while the average change in time for question 21 was 25.11 ms.
The standard deviation for question 5 was much higher at 81.58 ms, compared to question
21’s standard deviation of 56.43 ms, potentially indicating more drastic and distinct mouse
movements when telling the truth.
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Survey 13’s Change in Time Histograms
(b)(a)
Figure 6.13. (a) Survey 13’s change in time histogram for question 5, a green
radio button question. (b) Survey 13’s change in time histogram for question
21, a red radio button question.
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Survey 13’s Change in Time Profiles
(b)(a)
Figure 6.14. (a) Survey 13’s change in time profile for question 5, a green
radio button question. (b) Survey 13’s change in time profile for question
21, a red radio button question.
Survey 28 Results
Survey 28’s velocity histograms are depicted in Figure 6.15. Survey 28 had an average
velocity of 0.64 pixels/ms while answering question 5, compared to an average velocity
of 0.77 pixels/ms when answering question 21. As seen in the histograms, question 21
had a standard deviation of 1.15 pixels/ms, while question 5’s standard deviation was
approximately half of that, at 0.62 pixels/ms. Survey 28’s velocity profiles are depicted
in Figure 6.16. As indicated by the value on the y-axis, the participant increased velocity
in a similar manner at the head and tail end of the response for both questions, but by
approximately 3 orders of magnitude greater when deceiving, depicted in part (b).
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Survey 28’s Velocity Histograms
(b)(a)
Figure 6.15. (a) Survey 28’s velocity histogram for question 5, a green radio
button question. (b) Survey 28’s velocity histogram for question 21, a red
radio button question.
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Survey 28’s Velocity Profiles
(b)(a)
Figure 6.16. (a) Survey 28’s velocity profile for question 5, a green radio
button question. (b) Survey 28’s velocity profile for question 21, a red radio
button question.
Survey 28’s angle histograms and angle profiles are illustrated in Figure 6.17 and Figure
6.18, respectively. Survey 28 had a greater average anglewhen acting deceptively, recording
a -0.42 radian angle, compared to an average -0.39 radian angle when telling the truth in
question 5. Additionally, survey 28 utilized approximately three times more 0 radian angles
when telling the truth, vice when deceiving. When comparing parts (a) and (b) of Figure
6.18, a greater amount of time is spent using larger angles on response 21 (b) than in part
(a). Angle profiles for questions 5 and 21 follow a similar format, but the beginning portion
of part (b) depicts many more drastic changes in angle than part (a).
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Survey 28’s Angle Histograms
(b)(a)
Figure 6.17. (a) Survey 28’s angle histogram for question 5, a green radio
button question. (b) Survey 28’s angle histogram for question 21, a red radio
button question.
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Survey 28’s Angle Profiles
(b)(a)
Figure 6.18. (a) Survey 28’s angle profile for question 5, a green radio button
question. (b) Survey 28’s angle profile for question 21, a red radio button
question.
For change in time, survey 28’s associated histograms and delta_time profiles are detailed in
Figures 6.19 and 6.20. Survey 28 recorded an average delta_time of 34.46 ms for question
5, compared to an average delta_time of 38.77 ms for question 21. However, standard
deviation was actually higher for question 5 at 112.17 ms, compared to a standard deviation
of 95.56 ms for question 21.
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Survey 28’s Change in Time Histograms
(b)(a)
Figure 6.19. (a) Survey 28’s change in time histogram for question 5, a green
radio button question. (b) Survey 28’s change in time histogram for question
21, a red radio button question.
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Survey 28’s Change in Time Profiles
(b)(a)
Figure 6.20. (a) Survey 28’s change in time profile for question 5, a green
radio button question. (b) Survey 28’s change in time profile for question
21, a red radio button question.
Survey 30 Results
The velocity histograms and profiles for survey 30, another survey that was classified
correctly, are seen in Figures 6.21 and 6.22. Similar to survey 13, survey 30 also showed a
higher average velocitywhen telling the truth than when acting deceptively, similar to survey
28. The average velocity for question 5 was 0.949 pixels/ms, while the average velocity for
question 21 was 0.872 pixels/ms. Also unlike survey 10’s results, survey 30 actually had a
lower standard deviation for velocity for question 21, but only by approximately 4%. Four
distinct velocity peaks are noticeable in question 21’s velocity profile, whereas question 5
has one distinct velocity peak.
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Survey 30’s Velocity Histograms
(b)(a)
Figure 6.21. (a) Survey 30’s velocity histogram for question 5, a green radio
button question. (b) Survey 30’s velocity histogram for question 21, a red
radio button question.
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Survey 30’s Velocity Profiles
(b)(a)
Figure 6.22. (a) Survey 30’s velocity profile for question 5, a green radio
button question. (b) Survey 30’s velocity profile for question 21, a red radio
button question.
For angle, survey 30’s question 5 had an average of -0.39 radians, while question 21 yielded
an average angle of 0.25 radians. Of note, this is the first case study in which the average
angle for question 21 has been smaller than that of question 5. Question 5 also exhibited
a higher standard deviation for angle. Of note, survey 30’s angle histogram in part (b) of
Figure 6.23 depicts approximately 80 instances of -3 or 3 radian angles, whereas part (a)
depicts approximately 48 instances of similar angles. This may indicate that the user used
less drastic angle changes when answering truthfully than when answering deceptively.
Additionally, the angle profile in Figure 6.24 depicts more peaks in part (b) than in part (a).
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Survey 30’s Angle Histograms
(b)(a)
Figure 6.23. (a) Survey 30’s angle histogram for question 5, a green radio
button question. (b) Survey 30’s angle histogram for question 21, a red radio
button question.
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Survey 30’s Angle Profiles
(b)(a)
Figure 6.24. (a) Survey 30’s angle profile for question 5, a green radio button
question. (b) Survey 30’s angle profile for question 21, a red radio button
question.
6.4 Discussion
6.4.1 Aspects of HCI for Deception Detection
The best model results were produced by using velocity and delta_time in conjunction. In
combination, using velocity and delta_time as features in an Extra Trees classifier increased
baseline accuracy by a total of 37.41%, by far the best results out of the various combina-
tions analyzed. Velocity and angle together recorded the next highest increase in accuracy,
boosting model accuracy by about 26.89%. As a sole feature, delta_time and angle provided
the highest increases in accuracy, each with 21.62%, followed by velocity with a 16.36%
increase in accuracy.
While angle and delta_time performed the best when classifying green versus red questions,
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all three features in conjunction produced the best results when classifying green versus
orange questions. Although delta_time produced the highest accuracy as a sole feature when
classifying green versus red questions, it was the only sole feature to decrease accuracy for
green versus orange questions. The feature with the single greatest influence on green versus
orange classification was velocity, increasing accuracy by about 22.77
This research shows that angle, along with velocity, and delta_time can be used as HCI
indicators for deception detection. Based on how angle was calculated in this study, the
angle measurement most likely corresponds with mouse trajectory studies, discussed in
Chapter 2. Shown in Figure 6.4, a straighter mouse trajectory indicates smaller changes in
angle, as represented by horizontal lines in the angle profiles. Smaller changes in angle,
results in a smaller standard deviation for angle. Similar to studies that analyzed deception’s
effect onmouse trajectory, the response activationmodel accounts for larger angle deviations
when lying, as a user’smouse path towards a destinationmay not take the shortest routewhen
acting in a deceptive manner [6] [29]. Examples of how mouse movement and trajectory
correlate to deception detection can be found in Figures 2.2 and 3.1.
While a higher percentage of users showed greater average velocity when answering de-
ceptively than when answering truthfully, it is important to note the location of questions.
According to the survey layout explained in Chapter 3, every survey followed an identi-
cal format. For the first half of questions, participants were asked to answer questions as
themselves. For the second half of questions, participants were asked to impersonate a close
friend or significant other. Since the impersonation questions always followed as the second
portion of the survey, there is some level of familiarity with the survey format that could be
indicative of increases in average velocity for survey participants while being deceptive. In
order to create more accurate results that limit the effects of familiarity on response speed,
surveys should be randomized and given in varied orders.
In order to create a more balanced dataset with a larger sample size, more radio button ques-
tions should be added. Focusing on one type of question response would allow potentially
better modeling than relying on varied question types.
89
6.4.2 False Positives and False Negatives
When comparing green and red questions in isolation, FNs correlate to a red question being
falsely predicted as a green question. This FN indicates a deceptive response that was then
automatically detected as an honest response.While FPs can also occur (predicting a labeled
green question as a red question), this FN scenario presents a deeper security concern. A FN
situation induces error into a potential system of automated detection of deceptive behavior,
whereby a deceptive user may gain entry into a network or system without proper detection.
A FP scenario is also possible, whichwould indicate an honest user being flagged and filtered
as a deceptive user. If an automated system detects and flags an honest user as a deceptive
user, a legitimate person may lose access to a necessary network, incur a heavier workload
to unlock accounts, and may feel embarrassment or anger towards the organization. While
FPs certainly are not ideal, creating a model that errs towards FPs rather than FNs would be
ideal, as filtering out threatening personnel is a higher priority than ensuring quick access
to all legitimate personnel. To thoroughly protect networks and accounts, any automated
detection system should be reinforced with other methods, such as human corroboration. In
many instances throughout the DOD, this is already the case. A DOD worker who attempts
to log in or use a government computer to gain access to a specified network has most likely
already undergone screening or background checks. If proper identification checks are in
place prior to computer use, HCI techniques provide additional methods of verification to
ensure malicious activity on networks is limited.
6.4.3 Malicious Actors
While utilizing HCI for deception detection provides many benefits, it can also potentially
be altered to avoid detection altogether. Using HCI elements for deception detection is
non-intrusive, can be collected on user’s consistently, and can be used to create portions
of an intrusion detection system. However, if knowledge of this methodology is known
to malicious actors, such threats might purposely alter or train their mouse movements to
mimic consistent truth-like responses. In the same way that threat actors attempt to evade
barriers already in place for detection such as polygraphs, they will indeed attempt to learn
and alter behavior in order to evade detection through HCI. Countermeasures and awareness




Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter provides direction for potential future and tangential research on HCI-based
insider threat detection and concludes with a summary of the accomplishments and contri-
butions of this study.
7.1 Future Work
Our study eventually focused on the binary classification of basic green versus red radio
button question responses. However, because the focus of the study did not become clear
until after data collection, the sample size was limited. Future work should collect many
green versus red radio button responses in order to allow deeper analysis of the three features
discussed in this study.
Future work should also isolate radio button questions of colors yellow and orange as well,
where “unexpected” questions are asked to a user who is both supposed to answer some of
these questions truthfully and others as an impersonated person. Our study briefly modeled
unexpected questions that were asked to the impersonating person (orange), but did not
explore unexpected questions that were asked of an honest user (yellow) in detail, due to
limited sample size. This study demonstrated the usefulness of unexpected questions, as
binary classifications that included unexpected question comparisons largely outperformed
those that did not.
Rather than simple binary classifications, future work should consider multi-classification
as well. The ability to distinguish not only green responses (expected biographical truths)
from red responses(expected biographical lies), but green and red from yellow and orange
questions (unexpected questions) provides insights on the types of questions to include
in online forms that could potentially indicate deception. A multi-classification would be
beneficial in terms of categorizing the various types of deception, such as ill-intentioned de-
ception, benign user deception, or even embarrassment-driven deception to protect personal
information and integrity.
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Lastly, futurework should be done to analyze other HCI features on text-based responses that
could mitigate the need for a user-specific model in deception detection based on keyboard
inputs. In addition to analyzing text-based responses, other multiple choice responses, such
as selection or checkboxes, should also be analyzed. Additional HCI features should be
viewed as potential indicators of deception.
7.2 Contributions and Conclusion
Our study verified the potential for usingHCI cues as amethod of deception detection within
networks. Aspects of related work discussed in Chapter 2 are also corroborated within our
study. Although possible rationales are discussed in Section 6.4, 10%more participants had
higher average velocities when acting deceptively than when acting in a truthful manner.
In a study involving gyroscopes and accelerometers to determine how people orient their
bodies in response and in preparation for deception, participants provided evidence that
liars display higher rates of mouse acceleration and rotation in their responses than their
truth-telling counterparts [11]. While velocity is a different measurement than the rotation
rate explored in [11] and our study focused on HCI rather than general hand movement,
higher rates of average velocity were seen during deceptive responses. Moreover, the higher
average angle observations are consistent with higher rates of rotation seen in deceptive
users during the gyroscope and accelerometer study [11]. In the future, attention should be
paid to angle and how deception manifests through it.
Though not a main focus in our study, the effectiveness of introducing “unexpected” ques-
tions to determine deception is also validated. In our study, yellow and orange questions
both represented “unexpected” questions. Yellow questions were applied to the subset of
questions that were asked to truthful participants, while orange questions applied to the
subset of questions that were asked to participants who were impersonating another user.
In every basic model before major parameter hyper-tuning (including models that included
all question types), the binary classification of green versus yellow questions performed
better than the binary classification of green versus red questions. These results indicate
a noticeable difference to responses to expected and unexpected questions. Additionally,
red versus orange binary classifications also saw increases in accuracy when compared to
baseline accuracy, showcasing the noticeable difference in responses when introducing un-
expected questions to an impersonated scenario. Lastly, utilizing all three features (velocity,
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angle, and delta_time), classification of green versus orange questions showed a 13.29%
increase in accuracy from its associated baseline accuracy. Green versus orange classifica-
tion implies a scenario that compares an honest user encountering an expected question to
an impersonated user encountering an unexpected question.
Our research added to the works discussed above and to the studies discussed in Chapter 2
primarily by verifying angle as a suitable HCI feature for deception detection and by proving
the potential for a non-user specific model for deception classification. Utilizing the overall
results in Chapter 6 and specific discussion points in Section 6.3, we showed that, out of the
three features analyzed, angle was the most consistent feature in determining deception.
While previous studies focused on user-specific models to determine when and if an indi-
vidual user was applying deception on a device, our study shifted focus in order to determine
if a model could accurately detect deception in a user based on overall HCI features, rather
than relying on a specific comparison of that user’s current keyboard and mouse interaction
to a historical log of that user’s interaction. In short, our study proved that a non user-specific
model could be applied to determine deception to some degree in a first-time user. Negating
the need for a user-specific model would enable a more complete first-line of defense against
malicious activity among networks and in the use of online forms where historical user data
is unavailable. Preventing malicious activity at the earliest point of entry or on the periphery
prior to access being granted is a high priority for businesses, schools, the government,
and the DOD. However, malicious insiders are a well known threat, so, although preventing
malicious activity on the periphery is a goal, it must be complimented by other defensive
techniques. Utilizing non-user specific models may also play a relevant part in detecting
insider threats on a network.
Implementing non-user specific models that achieve any level of accuracy greater than
baseline accuracy would improve automated deception detection methods and thereby limit
the threat axis on specific networks, websites, and computers by detecting malicious or
untruthful behavior based on HCI components. Though there is much research to be done
in this area, this work solidifies the possibility of utilizing a user’s own HCI metrics
in order to determine the credibility of their responses. Applications of this automated
detection methodology span many workplaces and uses, including detecting impersonation
of online test-taking atmospheres, detecting fraudulent behavior on high-risk websites such
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as banking, homeowners, or education websites, as well as potential for deception detection
on account creation in order to limit insider threat access. Including more automation into
deception detection and thereby increasing recognition of certain deceptive and malicious
activities can trigger mitigation efforts, therefore limiting the overall malicious activity on a
network. Additionally, automating deception detection will reduce the overall manual effort
needed for internal security. Once deception is detected, various methods could be put in
place to immediately halt activity, such as screen locks, account deactivation, or an alarm
being set off. Utilizing HCI as a form of deception detection allows the DOD to harness all
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Complete List of Survey Questions
1. Baseline Text: "Please type the following in the text box below: I promise to
answer the questions truthfully and to the best of the ability, without help from
the internet. I understand the effects of lying on a questionnaire for research and
the negative consequences that can have undermining a study."
2. What is your first name?
3. What is your middle name?
4. What elementary school did you attend?
5. What gender do you identify with?
6. What is the current year? (Example: 1997)
7. In what city/town were you born?
8. What was the make of the first car you owned?
9. What month were you born?
10. What is your horoscope sign?
11. What is your birth date? (Mon/Day/Year, example: 11/2/1997)
12. How old are you? (Example: 21)
13. How many alcoholic drinks do you have weekly?
14. Have you ever smoked marĳuana?
15. What is the name of your first love?
16. Who do you trust more than anyone in this world?
17. "For the remaining set of questions, please pick a significant other, parent, or
close friend to impersonate. You should choose the person whom you know the
most information about and therefore are most likely to be able to answer the
questions truthfully and accurately. Please specify from which category below
your new identity belongs and answer the questions to the best of your ability.
Good luck!"
18. What is your first name?
19. What is your middle name?
20. What elementary school did you attend?
21. What gender do you identify with?
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22. What country do you live in? (No abbreviations)
23. In what city/town were you born?
24. What was the make of the first car you owned?
25. What month were you born?
26. What is your horoscope sign?
27. What is your birth date? (Mon/Day/Year, example: 11/2/1997)
28. How old are you? (Example: 21)
29. How many alcoholic drinks do you have weekly?
30. Have you ever smoked marĳuana?
31. What is the name of your first love?
32. Who do you trust more than anyone in this world?
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